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ABSTRACT 
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       Modern Algerian Politics.  
       Department of Political Science, June 2009. 
 
ADVISOR: Professor Michelle Angrist 
 
This thesis explores the evolution of modern Algerian politics and the transition of 
the Algerian government from a colonized nation to a free state. In the second half of the 
20th century Algeria was plagued with war and violence from both internal and external 
enemies. The Algerian War for Independence and the Algerian Civil War are frequently 
viewed as two separate conflicts with little or no ties yet after researching the two, one 
can draw a large number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the actions of the 
French in the War for Independence were strikingly similar to those of the Algerian 
administration in the 1990s. In addition, it can be claimed that the actions of the FLN in 
the 1950s greatly influenced the FIS policy of the 1990s. Finally, it could also be 
hypothesized that had the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of the “Phony 
War” in 1955, the course of Algerian politics would have been altered significantly 
towards a more peaceful outcome. It is not solely the actors in the conflicts that remained 
similar, but tactics and events as well as political actions and propaganda transcended the 
thirty years between the conflicts. When finally given the chance to be a free nation, the 
FLN and Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its 
European predecessor while the FIS knew of no other way to express its discontent than 
through a violent revolution like that of the FLN. The victims of the War for 
Independence now became the victimizers, with a new organization garnering sympathy 
for their cause. After nearly fifty years of political liberation, the Algerians have created a 
 ii
cyclical pattern where violence and political success have become mutually exclusive and 
change must come at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives
 iii
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In the second half of the 20th century Algeria was plagued with war and violence from 
both internal and external enemies. The Algerian War for Independence and the Algerian 
Civil War are frequently viewed as two separate conflicts with little or no ties yet after 
researching the two, one can draw a number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the 
actions of the insurgency organizations and the governments are strikingly similar. In less 
than fifty years the FLN evolved from victims of one war to the victimizers of another. In 
researching the two conflicts in-depth, one can also create a hypothetical theory that had 
the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of fighting in 1955, the course of 
Algerian politics would have been altered, resulting in a more peaceful outcome. It is 
through close analysis of the colonial history of Algeria, the subsequent War for 
Independence, and the Algerian Civil War that these two arguments can be fully 
supported and understood.  
The first section of the following work focuses on the details of the colonization 
of Algeria by France. After a three-year blockade of Algerian ports, the French King 
decided to invade the country in 1830, in an attempt to validate his power. Both Western 
and Eastern urban centers were colonized, pillaged, and depopulated and the French 
troops committed countless atrocities. Although Algerians resisted, the government was 
decentralized and the French quickly overtook the nation, implementing mass social, 
political, and economic changes. As France continued to transform the nation, an 
increasing number of French citizens began to establish roots in Algeria. The colons, or 
pied-noirs, grew increasingly powerful as the years passed and became an important 
player in French power politics. The colons not only influenced political institutions but 
they also introduced new political ideology to the citizens of Algeria.  
 The second section of the thesis is an in-depth study on the Algerian War for 
Independence which last from 1954 until 1962. There were many political parties which 
were pro-independence through peaceful means, yet divisions began to occur as the 
younger generations became impatient for results; consequently the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) formed with the goal of using force to obtain Algerian self-
determination. This radical movement of the FLN was a result of both Islamic and French 
influences. The first sign of conflict was on November 1, 1954 when there were over 
thirty simultaneous attacks on military or police targets by the military branch of the 
guerilla organization.  
 The FLN tactics during this war were unlike anything that the French had 
previously encountered. The liberation organization used scare tactics to coerce Algerian 
civilians to support it and relied on guerrilla warfare and terrorist techniques to alienate 
the French government from the Algerian people. These methods increased in frequency 
as the war evolved from a “Phony War” to a full conflict with the massacre at 
Philippeville in August 1955. It was not solely the FLN who took violent means to obtain 
its goal; the French adopted a policy of immediate, collective, and extremely violent 
responses. As the conflict between the rogue party and the European government 
escalated, France granted the military unbridled power to defeat the FLN. The military 
implemented torture techniques which varied from the use of electrodes to severe 
beatings and members of the FLN leadership mysteriously “committing suicide”.  
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 Finally, after the disintegration of the Fourth Republic of France in 1958 and the 
establishment of a new government, headed by Charles de Gaulle, it appeared that there 
was progress towards a mutual agreement, with the new President acknowledging that the 
self-determination of Algeria was the only possible solution to end the war. After four 
more years, which included an attempted French military coup and the continuation of 
violence by both sides, the Evian Accords were signed on March 19, 1962 and the 
Algerians officially received their independence four months later. Not only did Algeria 
lose between 350,000 and 1.5 million citizens in the conflict, but the war justified the use 
of violence as a means of obtaining political success. This theory would later be used to 
validate the actions of both the FLN and the FIS, as the organizations battled for control 
over Algeria’s political landscape. 
 The third section of the thesis is a detailed case study of the Algerian Civil War, 
which began in 1992, under President Chadli Bendjedid. The FLN had been in power 
since the end of the War for Independence and used its actions against the French, with 
the support of the military, to validate its leadership position. During the late 1970s and 
1980s, Algeria was undergoing a severe economic crisis and in an attempt to appease the 
citizens, Bendjedid overthrew the single party system and created a new Constitution, 
which created a more plural, democratic government. In response to both the economic 
crisis and the new opportunity to become involved in politics, a coalition of Islamic 
groups was created under the name of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). After winning 
the first round of Parliamentary election at the end of 1991, the FIS was viewed as a 
serious threat by many members of the government’s cabinet, including military officials. 
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At the risk of losing power with the continuation of the elections, the military leaders 
informed Bendjedid that he was to cancel the elections and resign as President.  
 What resulted was a deeply divided and fragmented government and nation over 
the start of a civil war between the Algerian military and the guerrilla fighters of the FIS. 
Some armed branches of the FIS, especially the GIA and MIA, believed in jihad and it 
adopted a policy of terror attacks against civilians and government institutions alike. The 
members would bomb heavily populated places and commit massacres on villages. In 
response, the Algerian military implemented a policy of violent, collective punishments. 
As the years passed, the violence continued to escalate, with atrocities being committed 
by both sides. The Algerian Civil War never had a decisive ending yet the combination of 
the fair and free election of President Bouteflika and his later efforts of reconciliation 
with leaders of the FIS party, led to the weakening of the FIS and the GIA by 2000. In the 
end, the political system of Algeria is certainly more pluralistic and democratic than it 
was in the late 1980s, yet the nation lost an estimated 150,000 civilians in the process.  
 In conclusion, after comparing the conflicts of the War for Independence and the 
Algerian Civil War, the thesis draws upon two main suppositions. The first is that, 
despite the differences that exist, the FLN of the 1950s and the FIS of the 1990s, as well 
as the Algerian and the French administrations, share a number of parallels. It can be 
claimed that the FLN adopts the role of the French in the 1990s and makes the evolution 
from the victim to the victimizer. The second conclusion is that had France not adopted a 
policy of war in the 1950s, Algeria would have been left with a more moderate political 
population and the FLN would have been stripped of its political legitimacy; the Algerian 
Civil War could have been avoided. 
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 The first relationship analyzed is the link between the FLN and the FIS insurgent 
organizations. There are many examples which could be used to support the claim that 
the FIS of the 1990s took many of their policies, strategies, and tactics from the FLN of 
the 1950s. Both relied heavily on scare tactics and threats of terrorism to receive the 
support of Algerian citizens. The FLN hoped that the French would react to these 
activities with unequal, greater responses, which they did; this was the same goal of the 
FIS in the 1990s and once again the policy worked.  
  The second relationship examined is the parallel between both the French and 
Algerian administrations. Both the French government and the FLN offered empty 
promises of reform in the hopes of placating the population prior to each crisis and when 
the threat to its power continued to thrive, both governments turned to policies of 
collective reprisals and torture as a means of stifling the opposition. Another shared 
reaction of both governments was the role that each gave to the military as the conflict 
unfolded. Each provided its armed forces with unbridled power and as a result each 
undercut any possibility for a political negotiation with its opponent.  
 Finally, it can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955, prior to the 
Philippeville Massacre, it may have resulted in a more peaceful outcome for Algerian 
politics. The voice of the moderate political party would not have been stifled by the FLN 
and it would have provided a balance to the more radical policy of the organization. The 
FLN would also not have obtained its claim of legitimacy; the sentiment garnered from 
the war carried the party for over thirty years. In the end, this body of work tries to prove 
that when finally given the chance to be a free nation, the Algerian administration knew 
of no other way to govern than that of its European predecessor while the FIS knew of no 
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other way to express its discontent than through a violent revolution like the FLN. Since 
Algeria has never been able to create its own history, the colonization by the French 
resulted in irreparable damages that lasted far longer than the War for Independence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
Chapter 1: The History Behind the Franco-Algerian Relationship 
 Since its inception, Algeria was a nucleus uniting Africa, Europe, the Middle 
East, and Asia. The land was formally settled by the Berbers in 4000 B.C.E. and since then 
its geographic location and wealth of resources has resulted in six invasions prior to its 
colonization by France. The Phoenician-Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the 
Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Turks all conquered the Berbers and each instance 
introduced a different aspect to the Algerian culture although the argument can be made 
that it was the Arabs and Turks whose impact has had the most longevity.  
It was the Arab leader who first tried to overtake the country in 682, Oqba Ibn 
Nafi, who converted the Berber leaders to Islam. These Berber leaders brought the 
lessons of the Koran back to their tribes and “Islam managed to bring about a melding in 
the population between the autochthonous Berber culture and the new Koranic ethic” 
(Stora 2001, 3). Islam overcame the pagan belief system that was so prevalent in the early 
stages of the nation and created equality amongst all believers. The faith of Islam gave 
the Berbers the cohesion that they had previously lacked, one that became increasingly 
important in the struggle to regain their independence. The Arabs did not only change the 
Berbers’ religion, but also impacted their national identity. Today, almost all Algerians 
are Berber in origin, yet only a minority define themselves as Berber, separating 
themselves from the Arab culture and identity which has been adopted by the majority of 
the population (CIA “World Factbook, Algeria”, 2008). The introduction of Islam is an 
example of the impact that an invader can have on a country, yet no invasion has had 
more influence on modern-day Algerian politics and society than that of the French. 
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 During the period of Turkish rule, which lasted for over three hundred years, the 
Algerians were able to maintain a certain amount of autonomy. They were able to 
preserve their rural tribes and the nation was divided into four different provinces, 
Algiers, Titri, Oran, and Constantine, which varied in size and resources. Each province 
was further divided into districts and “despite the excessive decentralization of power, 
which resulted partly from the segmentary social organization, this pre-colonial state, 
with a bureaucratic and military apparatus, managed to govern the population and hence 
hold the entire society together for more than three centuries” (Bennoune 1988, 17). 
Despite some linguistic differences, the people of Algeria had a relatively communal 
culture, sharing a history of tribal communities and a common ideology. 
 Prior to the French invasion in 1830, Algeria had undergone a complicated 
evolution in political institutions; but in 1671 the leadership position of the dey was 
created. The dey was selected by the divan, a committee of sixty notables, who restricted 
the dey’s power. Serving as a “constitutional autocrat”, the dey only had direct control 
over the Algiers region but was able to appoint beys, who governed the other three 
provinces (Metz 1993, 20). This political system created a decentralized government and 
the beys were primarily left to their own devices. Although the structure led by the dey 
controlled the country for over a hundred and fifty years, it was its weakness that 
inevitably contributed to the takeover by the French. 
 The pre-1830s economy of Algeria was already distinctly divided between rural 
and urban areas. Algeria’s rural production was based on four primary activities: 
agriculture, animal husbandry, horticulture, and the planting of fruit trees. The 
geographical conditions of Algeria “fostered a broad specialization of production along 
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ecological lines”, further promoting the decentralization of the Algerian government 
(Bennoune 1988, 23). There existed a social hierarchy within the pre-colonial rural areas 
of Algeria; the population was divided into the big landowners, the peasant cultivators, 
and the impoverished or landless producers (Bennoune 1988, 23). Throughout most of 
the Turks’ rule, the urban areas of Algeria were prosperous, with “ruling elements, 
merchants, artisans, and apprentices” (Bennoune 1988, 27). Although the rural economic 
sector of Algeria was relatively protected from European influence, the urban areas of the 
nation experienced an increasingly commercial aggressiveness from the European 
capitalist nations beginning in the 18th century (Bennoune 1988, 27). This undermined 
the economic activities that had previously been the source of funding for urban areas and 
as a result “certain coastal cities and towns lost about half of their inhabitants” and the 
cities underwent decay (Bennoune 1988, 27). Despite being seemingly backwards 
compared to European economic institutions, the pre-colonial economy of Algeria was 
relatively prosperous in both urban and rural sectors. 
The History of the Franco-Algerian Relationship prior to 1830 
 France’s interest in expanding its influence in Northern Africa was based on the 
two nations’ pre-colonial commercial relationship. The trading relationship between the 
Maghreb and France began in the Middle Ages, with its importance being fully realized 
in the thirteenth century (Bennoune 1988, 29). For over five hundred years the trading 
relationship seemed relatively equal and balanced, yet it was at the end of the eighteenth 
century that French merchants began to overtake the North African markets. They had 
founded a number of factories and trading establishments in Algeria and exploited its 
natural resources, using everything from wheat and wool to coral to increase the wealth 
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of the European nation. France, through a pre-established trading company, Compagnie 
d’Afrique, began to buy the monopoly on Algeria commerce. The “monopoly over coral 
fishing in the eastern coast and the export of wool, animal skins, wax, and wheat through 
the port of Bone was granted to France for the amount of 30,000 dollars per year… The 
bey of Oran also received 30,000 dollars from a firm for the right of export monopoly” 
(Bennoune 1988, 30). The extremity of the “unequal exchange between the two different 
economic systems” prompted the French Consul, Deval, to consider the possibility of 
France obtaining control over La Calle, the country’s economic stronghold in Algeria 
(Bennoune 1988, 31). The domination of La Calle was simply the beginning of France’s 
elaborate devices to impose its power on Algeria. 
 The eventual collision of France and Algeria can be found in the longstanding 
economic and political relationship between the two nations. A large number of debts had 
been acquired by French merchants who purchased wheat for the French state during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The leaders of France had never intended to repay 
Algeria for these loans and the dey became extremely agitated (Stora 2001, 3). The 
French viewed this refusal to repay the debts as a means of punishment for the Algerian 
Regency, which had supported the Revolutionary cause in 1796. This unfair response was 
compounded by the events of a meeting that took place on April 27, 1827 between the 
Algerian dey and the French consul, Deval. The two met to discuss the contentious issue 
of La Calle and the possibility of France’s occupation. Naturally, the dey was adamantly 
opposed to such measures and Deval claimed that the dey struck him on the nose with his 
fan in what is known as “The Fan Affair”. Taking offense at such treatment, France broke 
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all diplomatic relationships with Algeria and implemented a blockade of the entire sea 
coast.  
 The conquest of Algeria by the French was motivated by both long-term and 
short-term goals, some national in nature and others more individually motivated. While 
it is true that “by consolidating the influence of France in the western Mediterranean 
basin, the government would open their markets and create outlets for trade and nascent 
industry”, the short-term goals resulted in the more immediate push for this military 
conquest (Stora 2001, 4). By focusing national attention on a struggle abroad, Charles X 
expected to promote patriotic sentiment and increase his popularity in the hopes of 
reestablishing an absolute monarchy. There also existed the fear “that Britain, which was 
pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would move to fill the 
vacuum left by a French pullout” (Metz 1994, 24). The Algerian government was 
decentralized and the dey was politically, militarily, and economically weak since there 
was still a certain amount of dependence on the Ottoman Empire. Algeria appeared to be 
a weak target that would present the French with an easy victory and by acting upon this 
weakness, the French were able to prevent the British from increasing its colonial power. 
These factors combined led to a military conquest that took several unexpected turns over 
the years.  
The Invasion and Colonization of Algerian Urban Centers 
 After three years of an unsuccessful blockade, Charles X initiated a military 
expedition against Algiers with the hope of saving his monarchical rule. On June 12, 
1830, thirty-four thousand French soldiers landed 27 kilometers west of Algiers, 
beginning what was to be a long conflict between the two nations. The dey responded 
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with seven thousand janissaries, nineteen thousand soldiers from Constantine and Oran 
and seventeen thousand Kabyles (Metz 1994, 23). Although Algeria sent more troops into 
the conflict, France had superior artillery and was able to organize more effectively; as a 
result Algiers was conquered after three weeks. As the dey fled to exile, the French began 
their “civilizing mission” with raping the women of the city, looting, desecrating 
mosques, and destroying cemeteries (Metz 1994, 23). Within one year of the initial 
occupation, Algiers had lost thirty thousand inhabitants, who were either killed or forced 
into exile (Bennoune 1988, 37). Both Western and Eastern urban centers were colonized, 
pillaged, and depopulated in the same manner. Examples can be found in the city of 
Constantine, which lost ten thousand inhabitants, or Masacra, a city whose initial 
population was ten thousand, of which nine thousand were killed (Bennoune 1988, 38). 
The occupation of the urban areas of Algeria is the first of the four stages of French 
colonization, which lasted from 1830 until 1839. The urban areas resisted but since there 
were no centralized forces, they fell quickly and were shown little mercy by the colonial 
powers.  
The Expansion and Opposition of French Influence in Rural Areas 
 The second stage of the French occupation was the colonial army’s attempt to 
extend its sovereignty across rural Algeria. Roughly lasting from 1840 until 1847, the 
French encountered many difficulties and conflicts during the implementation of its 
plans. The most successful opposition that immediately followed the defeat of Algiers in 
1830 was found in the region of Constantine and was led by the bey, Ahmad ibn 
Muhammad. He initiated radical policy reforms and created a uniformity and solidarity 
within his realm of leadership in an attempt to increase the strength of locality to defend 
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against the French. He replaced Turkish leaders with local leaders, made Arabic the 
official language, and attempted to reform finances according to the precepts of Islam. 
The French had to retreat from Constantine in 1836 but it was captured the following 
year with a renewed effort.  
Until 1840, the French adopted a policy of limited occupation, during which the 
French would occupy the main cities in the country but would exercise their dominion 
over the rest of nation through native rulers. This policy,  
took concrete shape in 1834 when the position of governor-general for Algeria 
was created… yet the policy of limited occupation failed because it was 
incompatible with two dynamic elements in the Algerian situation: the military 
resistance of Algerian Muslims to French rule, and the uncontrollable ambitions 
aroused in a technically advanced community exercising power over a less 
advanced society (Abun-Nasr 1987, 253).  
 
 Although Ahmad bey did implement policies that had a foundation in Islamic beliefs and 
led efforts to counter those of the French, he was not the main leader of the Islamic holy 
revolution against the colonizers.  
 The French did not only experience challengers in the East with Ahmad bey; they 
also faced an Islamic-based revolt in the West. In 1832, in the city of Oran, the “superior 
of a religious brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din… launched attacks against the French and their 
allies” (Metz 1994, 25). Seeing as he was becoming weak with age, that same year the 
tribal elders elected ad Din’s young son, Abd al Qadir, to lead the jihad. “A devout and 
austere marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a resourceful warrior” who 
quickly gained support throughout Africa (Metz 1994, 25). He began to implement his 
plan of building a Muslim state with the interior communities of the nation and by 1839, 
Abd al Qadir controlled more than two-thirds of the country (Metz 1994, 25). He was 
able to collect taxes, maintain armed forces, and stimulate economic activity for the land 
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under his control. The French in Algeria were concerned about this growing Muslim state 
and the possibility of it restricting European expansion; adding to their concerns were the 
numerous battles between Abd al Qadir’s forces and French troops. The colonizers’ 
unease continued to grow and, two years after signing a peace treaty recognizing Abd al 
Qadir’s regime, the French provoked the Muslim government by occupying Constantine. 
Although Abd al Qadir initially fought off the French troops, the European nation’s 
resources and manpower began to weaken his efforts; by 1840 one-third of France’s 
soldiers were stationed in Algeria. By 1843 the Muslim state fell and Abd al Qadir 
surrendered on December 23, 1847. He represents one of the individuals behind the 
Algerian opposition and is thought of by the Algerians as the first hero of Algerian 
independence.  
Colonization and Military Control, 1847-1871 
 From the time of the surrender of Abd al Qadir in 1847 until 1871, the actions of 
the French colonial army focused solely on severing all of Algeria’s former economic 
and political ties. By 1848 nearly all of Northern Algeria was under French control and 
the country was forced to uproot and transform its administration. It was during this time 
that the drastic inequality between the French and the Algerians started to be put into 
practice. Louis-Philippe’s reign over France’s constitutional monarchy was overthrown 
this same year and “the new government of the Second Republic ended Algeria’s status 
as a colony and declared the occupied lands an integral part of France” (Metz 1994, 29). 
Three of the four main regions, Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, were organized as French 
départements and were brought under a common civilian government. French citizens 
were able to vote for their representatives on councils as well as their mayors, whereas 
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the “Muslims had to be appointed, could not hold more than one-third of council seats, 
and could not serve as mayors or assistant mayors” (Metz 1994, 29). Those who lived 
outside of the zones settled by the colons, or French, were able to function under a régime 
du sabre, where local Muslim administrations were able to have control of government 
affairs, but were forced to report to the French military commanders. 
 With another change in French leadership came another set of changes towards 
the Algerian colony. Napoleon III took power in 1852 and was “profoundly impressed 
with the nobility and virtue of the tribal chieftains and shocked by the self-serving 
attitude of the colon leaders” (Metz 1994, 29). Unlike many of the colons, Napoleon III 
wanted to limit the expansion of the French as well as the interaction between the 
Europeans and the Muslims. He planned on promoting the Arab race, claiming that 
“‘Algeria is not a colony… but an Arab kingdom… I am as much the emperor of the 
Arabs as of the French!’” (Stora 2001, 5). His desire to be the roi des Arabes (King of the 
Arabs) in the royaume Arabe (Arab kingdom) led to the initiation of two different decrees 
which affected the “tribal structure, land tenure, and legal status of Muslims in French 
Algeria” (Metz 1994, 29). Although Napoleon III meant to protect the Algerians with 
these decrees, they furthered the already palpable separation between the colons and 
Muslims in the nation. 
 The first of these two decrees was executed in 1863 and directly addressed the 
issue of land and ownership. The goal was to renounce the state’s claims to tribal lands 
and eventually end in private ownership for tribes, resulting in the protection of their land 
from the colons. Unfortunately there was little accountability for this ruling and French 
officials who were sympathetic with colons took much of the land that they had surveyed 
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into the public domain. In addition, many of those tribal leaders who had received some 
part of land quickly sold their communal property with the hopes of making a quick 
profit.  
Napoleon III visualized “three distinct Algerias: a French colony, an Arab 
country, and a military camp, each with a distinct form of government” and the second 
declaration was meant to highlight the differences and separation between the three (Metz 
1994, 30). It stated that, if the Algerians became French citizens, then they would be 
granted the protection of French law. Yet in order to gain citizenship they had to accept 
the full jurisdiction of the French legal code and therefore reject the importance of the 
religious courts; in other words “a Muslim had to renounce his religion in order to 
become a French citizen” (Metz 1994, 30). Although it was meant to propose an option to 
those who would like to be included under the protection and legal system of the French, 
it created an immense feeling of resentment among Muslims, with fewer than three 
thousand of them choosing to obtain citizenship.  
 France’s Second Empire ended in 1870 when the Prussians captured Napoleon III 
and the colons in Algeria viewed this change in leadership as an opportunity to overthrow 
the military regime, establish a civilian controlled administration, and completely 
immerse Algeria into France. One of France’s ministers, Adolphe Crémieux, was given 
the task of uniting the two countries and issued a series of decrees “providing for 
representation of the Algerian départements in the National Assembly of France and 
confirming colon control over local administration” (Metz 1994, 31). The Crémieux 
Decrees granted blanket citizenship to all Algerian Jews, totaling forty-thousand 
individuals. This created a distinct division between the Algerian Muslim population and 
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the Algerian Jewish population that did not exist prior to the colonial period. This decree 
segregated the Jewish population from the rest of the nation because the Muslims 
recognized them as members of the colon sector whereas the colons saw little difference 
between Algerian Muslims and Jews.  
 Riots broke out across Algeria in 1871, after the global demand for grain had 
pushed the price of Algerian wheat to European levels and Algerian farmers sold their 
crops to speculators, depleting the reserves that were needed when crops failed. A famine 
ensued and with it came serious consequences; for example, in a three year period, “it 
was estimated that twenty percent of the Muslim population of Constantine died” (Metz 
1994, 31). In addition to the riots, France’s loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871 
led to extreme land reforms due to a new pressure for the French government to find a 
place for the five thousand refugees from Alsace-Lorraine. This sudden need of land was 
the perfect reason to impose harsh restrictions on the Muslims, indirectly providing 
punishment from the riots. Although the Senatus Consultus of 1863 was not overly 
successful in the distribution of land titles to Arabs, the French used the Warnier Laws to 
fulfill their need of land and reverse what few land titles had been granted to the Arabs. 
Initiated by the leader of the colon delegation, Auguste Warnier, these laws resulted in 
the “facilitation of the private transfer of land to settlers and continued the Algerian 
state’s appropriation of land from the local population and the distribution to settlers” 
(Metz 1994, 32). These land reforms doubled the amount of land owned by Europeans as 
well as the number of settlers in a decade. As a result of the land exchange, “tens of 
thousands of unskilled Muslims, who had been uprooted from their land, wandered into 
the cities or to colon farming areas in search of work” therefore lowering the price of 
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labor and furthering the inequality between the colon and indigenous populations (Metz 
1994, 31).  
The Supremacy of the Colons in Algeria, 1871- 1914 
 After the revolts of 1871 and the land reforms of 1873, colons were given 
complete control of Algeria in all sectors. The Algerians had little alternative but to 
“attempt to live in a society whose political and economic structures were geared to serve 
the interests of the settler community, and whose educational system was designed to 
submerge the Arab-Islamic identity” (Abun-Nasr 1987, 268). Government representation 
in Algeria’s National Assembly was just one example of the inequality that permeated 
every aspect of life in the country. The Muslim population had virtually no representation 
on both the national and local level. Because of the religious requirements imposed on 
individuals who qualified as French citizens, only 50,000 Algerians were eligible to vote 
by 1915 (Metz 1994, 32). Reforms, regardless of how modest, were impossible to pass 
because of the power of the serving colons and their unwillingness to ameliorate the lives 
of the Algerians. It was important for the French-established, Algerian government to 
vote in a manner which supported the prominent attitudes and ideas of the colon 
population in order to avoid anarchy; “their support was important to any government’s 
survival” (Metz 1994, 32). Because of the land reforms that were able to be passed, the 
colons owned thirty percent of the total land, which included the majority of land that 
was fertile and accessible to irrigation. This allowed them to produce nearly two-thirds of 
the total agricultural exports just thirty years after installing their own civilian 
government.  
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 Not only were the colonial powers overtaking some of the most lucrative sectors 
of the Algerian economy, they were also increasing taxes for the native population. 
Despite their significant decrease in wages, the Muslim population was taxed 
considerably more than European settlers. By 1909 Muslims constituted almost ninety 
percent of the population yet they produced only twenty percent of the total income. 
Regardless of this vast difference in prosperity, the Muslims paid nearly seventy percent 
of the direct taxes (Metz 1994, 33). Despite paying the majority of taxes, the Muslim 
population did not reap the benefits of their efforts. The colon officials had control over 
the taxes and therefore used the funds to benefit the colon towns, which “had handsome 
municipal buildings and paved streets lined with trees, fountains, and statues” (Metz 
1994, 33). The disproportional distribution of tax burdens and tax revenues continued the 
sentiment of resentment that was becoming increasingly popular, even among those 
individuals who were pro-French. 
 The colons used taxes and land reforms to gain power over the Algerians through 
economic means and viewed education as a way to decrease the influence of the Islamic 
ideology that was so important to many Algerians. This was one of the final social 
domains in which change was needed for a complete separation from pre-colonial 
Algeria. For a population who had previously relied on religious schools, even for the 
most basic reading and writing instruction, “the colonial regime proved severely 
detrimental to the overall education for Algerian Muslims” (Metz 1994, 33). The colons 
had appropriated the lands upon which the religious foundations, that created much of the 
income to support religious institutions, were located. After cutting off the main source of 
Islamic funding in the nation, officials refused to allocate money to properly maintain 
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mosques and schools. The colons were spending five times the amount on European 
education as they were for Muslims, who had five times more children of school age 
(Metz 1994, 34). The lack of educational funding resulted in a spill-over effect; few 
Muslims received the education needed to become teachers and therefore Muslim schools 
became staffed primarily by French instructors, resulting in the continuous decline of 
Arabic studies. In 1890, a new effort was put forth to educate a small number of Muslims 
with Europeans in the French school system. Within a generation, a new class of Muslims 
had emerged. Known as the évolués, this group of well-educated Muslims had accepted 
French citizenship despite the constraints. Although not initially well-received by the 
majority of the Algerian Muslims, it was in this new class and its close interaction with 
the French that a new Algerian self-consciousness matured.  
Nationalism and Political Movements amongst the Algerian Population, 1914-1954 
 The events of World War I left the entire population of Algeria in a state of shock 
and truly tested the allegiance of both the colons and native Algerians. The pieds noirs, or 
colons, naturally felt the need to defend their nation and twenty-two thousand of them 
perished during the war. Despite their anger towards the French, the indigenous 
population’s role became more important than that of the colons. Recruitment led to 
173,000 Muslim soldiers, of which 25,000 died as well as the requisitioning of 119,000 
Muslim Algerians who were meant to satisfy the demand for labor in French cities (Stora 
2001, 12). When the war was over Algerian political ideology was beginning to undergo 
a drastic revolution, starting with those workers and soldiers who had experienced first-
hand the rights of the French. Woodrow Wilson’s idea of self-determination, the end of 
the Ottoman Empire, the growing movement of pan-Arabism, and the sudden influx of 
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Algerian workers to post-war France all led to the creation and development of the idea 
of national independence and created a sudden solidarity among the Algerian population 
that it had never experience before.  
 During the post-war period a number of political movements and organizations 
began to form, varying from integrationists to independence groups. One of the earliest 
political movements came in the form of the Federation of Elected Natives (Fédération 
des Élus Indigènes- FÉI), a group which stemmed from an earlier political faction, the 
Young Algerians (established by Ferhat Abbas).Primarily comprised of évolués, the FÉI 
was an integrationist group which lobbied for assimilation with the French pending the 
rights of full citizenship to Muslims, without renouncing their religious status, equal pay 
for Algerian government employees, the abolition of travel restrictions between the two 
countries and electoral reform (Metz 1994, 36). A counter to this group was the Star of 
North Africa (Étoile Nord-Africain, known as Star), the first political organization that 
openly demanded for Algerian independence (Stora 2001, 17). Established by North 
African workers in Paris and led by Messali Hadj, it promoted separation from France, 
freedom of press, a parliament chosen through universal suffrage, the confiscation of 
large land estates, and the re-institution of Arabic schools (Metz, 1994, 36). The party 
was banned in 1929 and reformed in 1933 only to later dissolve in 1937. That same year, 
Messali Hadj formed the Party of Algerian People (Parti du Peuple Algérien- PPA), a 
movement to mobilize the working class in Algeria and use political action to combat 
colonization. These groups looked to France as the inspiration for their ideological 
models and it was the First World War which allowed the Algerians to gain experience in 
a political atmosphere that was so unlike their own.  
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While some political groups were formed with the sense of nationalistic pride as 
their foundation, others were established on the nation’s principles of Islamic and Arabic 
roots. Beginning in the 1920s the “reform ulama, or religious scholars, promoted a 
purification of Islam in Algeria and a return to the Quran” (Metz 1994, 37). Establishing 
their own schools, they stressed the importance of the Arab language and culture, unlike 
those institutions that had been operated by the French. The reformist ulama created the 
Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens- 
AUMA). The AUMA gained in popularity and “struck a cord among Muslim masses, 
with whom it had closer ties than the other nationalist organizations” (Metz 1994, 37). 
After being seen as a threat, the AUMA was no longer able to preach in official mosques, 
therefore limiting their power. The pieds-noirs rejected any sort of reform movement, 
including those that were pro-French, and forced France and other European nations to 
support their position of control over the Algerian administration and police forces. 
 Algerian Muslims once again rallied to the aid of the French during World War II, 
yet the establishment of the Vichy Regime and the increased popularity of the idea of 
Algerian independence would forever change the Franco-Algerian relationship. The 
Algerian administration enforced the anti-Semitic laws that were imposed by the Vichy 
regime, stripping the Algerian Jews, as well as the few Muslims who had conformed, 
their rights of citizenship. After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria at the end of 1942, 
France pleaded to the Muslim population for the re-enforcement of troops and Ferhat 
Abbas, former leader of the Young Algerians, as well as twenty-four other Muslim 
leaders replied that they would be willing to fight as long as they were able to hold a 
conference and develop their own political, economic, and social institutions within the 
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French framework. The resulting Manifesto of the Algerian People was enormously 
influenced by Abbas, “who had abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-
determination” (Metz 1994, 40). The document claims that “The French colony only 
admits equality with Muslim Algeria on one level; sacrifice on the battlefield” (Horne 
2006, 42). This clean break from the idea of assimilation called for the “immediate and 
effective participation of Muslims in the government and the establishment of a 
constitution guaranteeing inter alia, liberty and equality for all Algerians, the suppression 
of feudal property- as well as various other planks borrowed from the more radical 
platform of Messali” (Horne 2006, 42). Although the Manifesto was rejected by the 
French government, the conference resulted in the joining of Abbas and Hadj with the 
organization, Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté- 
AML). The AML would clearly define the split between the native Algerians and the 
pieds-noirs.   
 Amid the strong sentiment of animosity towards the French, social unrest grew 
amongst all social classes as a result of a poor wheat harvest, the shortage of 
manufactured goods, and severe unemployment; thousands of hungry peasants streamed 
towards the cities where they were met with a lack of jobs and were forced to congregate 
around soup kitchens (Stora 2001, 21). It was under these pretences that the AML 
organized demonstrations in most Algerian cities on May 8, 1945. After being told that 
they were not allowed to promote their nationalist sentiments during the protests, the 
marchers carried banners that read, “Down with fascism and colonialism” and police in 
Sétif opened fire on them (Stora 2001, 21). The marchers countered these attacks and 
over a hundred Europeans were killed. Word of the violence spread across the nation and 
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villagers attacked colon settlements and government buildings. On May 10th, “the 
authorities organized a ‘war of reprisals’ which turned into a massacre” (Stora 2001, 23). 
Shootings and summary executions as well as blanket bombings were carried out and 
although French estimates state that 1,500 Muslims died as a result (Metz 1994, 42), 
Algerian nationalists claim that the figure was upwards of 45,000 individuals (Stora 
2001, 22). This act of violence created an irreparable rift between the Muslim majority 
and the European minority; it set the stage for the commencement of the Algerian War 
for independence nine years later. 
Although the AML coalition was not formally recognized by the French, the work 
of Messali Hadj did not come to a halt. The political leader continued to operate the PPA 
as a clandestine organization until 1946, when he reconstituted it under a new name. The 
Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph 
of Democratic Liberties, MTLD) continued Hadj’s quest of Algerian independence 
through peaceful means and was founded with the goals of the Manifesto in mind. It 
desired to bring together “those Muslims who were still committed to evolutionary 
change” (Evans 2007, 53). After a year of activity, the most militant Algerians, “those 
clearly committed to the armed struggle” were drawn to the Organisations Spéciale (OS), 
the paramilitary group for the MTLD (Evans 2007, 53). Formed secretly in 1947, the core 
of this sub-division was comprised of a group of young men in their twenties, who were 
from a literate artisan or middle-class background. Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, 
and Mohammed Boudiaf were all members of the OS, which trained approximately 4,500 
men before mounting its first action. The organization was dismantled by 1951, yet many 
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of its former members remained active in politics and took shelter in other Middle 
Eastern nations, including Egypt.  
After the Organisations Spéciale disbanded, the previous members feared that the 
nationalist movement had lost its momentum. The ex-militants believed that the MTLD 
was playing into the “hands of colonialism and reinforced their conviction that what was 
needed was a totally new organization which would prepare the way for an armed 
insurrection” (Evans 2007, 55). The same young men, including Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, 
and Boudiaf, formed the Comite Révolutionnaire pour l’Unité et L’Action in March 
1954. They “were under no illusions about the scale of the task confronting them but their 
confidence was bolstered by the French defeat in Indo-China” (Evans 2007, 55). The 
group was renamed the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) 
on October 10, 1954. Since many of the leaders of the FLN were veterans of the French 
military and former activists in the MTLD, it is not surprising that the organization 
created a military-style structure with a military equivalent, the Armée de Libération 
Nationale (ALN). It would be the ALN that would commit many of the acts of terror in 
the war against France. 
While the FLN was beginning to take shape, the MTLD continued its struggle 
towards self-determination. On November 4, 1954 the Council of Ministers disbanded the 
MTLD and several hundred nationalist leaders were arrested. Those who were not, were 
forced to hide underground or join the guerrilla forces of the FLN. The militant 
organization intended to benefit from the dissolution of Hadj’s party, hoping to take 
ownership of the weapons that it possessed as well as its connections abroad. Messali 
Hadj was adamantly opposed to the use of violence against the French as a means of 
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obtaining political liberation and established the Mouvement National Algerien (National 
Algerian Movement, MNA), which was the only socialist faction to not eventually join 
the cause of the FLN. 
War of Independence, 1954-1962 
 On the morning of November 1, 1954 the National Liberation Front began a war 
that would shake the foundations of France’s Fourth Republic and inevitably lead to its 
collapse. Launching attacks against military installations, police posts, warehouses, 
communications facilities, and public utilities around the nation, members of the FLN 
called on Muslims to “restore the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, 
within the framework of Islam” (Metz 1994, 44). The response from the French was 
minimal and few thought that the nation had just entered into another war (Stora 2001, 
38). This first year can be referred to as a “Phony War”, a time where the FLN was able 
to spread its campaign throughout the countryside and the French could attempt to 
implement reforms to pacify the Muslims (Stora 2001, 41). Jacques Soustelle, who was 
the Governor of Algeria beginning on February 11, 1955, was known for being a liberal 
and he tried to understand the plight of the Algerian Muslims. Trying to balance the 
demands of the FLN with France’s allegiance to the colons, he promised integration and 
reforms- but it was too late, and on August 20, 1955, the “Phony War” ended and the real 
conflict began. 
 This watershed event was based on a poorly planned revolt where several 
thousand peasants and agricultural workers rushed to thirty villages, including four major 
cities: Collo, Constantinois, Guelma, and Philippeville. At first, the clash at Philippeville 
followed the standard FLN policy of attacking solely government and military targets. 
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Then there was a dramatic escalation of violence where the FLN and its supporters killed 
one hundred and twenty three people, of which seventy-one were European citizens. The 
repression for the Philippeville massacre, which was immediate, collective, and violent, 
set the standard for the rest of the war and although the official death toll was 1,273, the 
FLN has put forth a figure of 12,000 Muslims losing their lives to the French following 
the attack. It was this incident that ended all French “peace-keeping missions” and 
resulted in a state of emergency that provided carte blanche for the French army.   
 The tactics used during this war from both the French and the FLN were 
increasingly brutal. Recognizing the fact that it had smaller troop numbers and less 
technologically advanced weapons, the FLN resorted to guerrilla tactics. Focusing on 
“ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, 
the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon 
farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities” 
(Metz 1994, 48). The French frequently resorted to means of torture and brutal tactics in 
the quest to maintain their colonial holdings, yet the FLN also would commonly kidnap 
individuals and ritually murder and mutilate captured members of the French military, 
colons, suspected collaborators, and traitors. In addition to torture tactics, the French also 
applied  
the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, 
supplying, cooperating with the guerrillas… they also initiated a program of 
concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in 
camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels (Metz 
1994, 51). 
 
Living conditions in the camps were poor and in the three years that this tactic was used, 
over two million individuals were moved from their homes, and were unable to 
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reestablish themselves economically or socially. The French changed their tactics in 1958 
as its government began to collapse and adopted a policy of using mobile forces to 
complete search-and-destroy missions.  
The hope of ending the war came with the fall of the Fourth Republic and the 
establishment of a more liberal French leader. Regardless of citizenship, many 
individuals were pleased to see Charles de Gaulle come into power and felt that his 
freethinking views were the key to ending the violence between France and Algeria. With 
his proposed social, economic, and political reforms, he was the improving the Muslim 
situation while weakening the power of the FLN in Algeria. In September 1958 all 
Muslims were granted the right to vote and one year later de Gaulle “uttered the words 
‘self-determination’, which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria 
formally associated with France” (Metz 1994, 53). Convinced that de Gaulle had 
betrayed them, the colons, backed by certain units of the army, staged riots in January 
1960 and began enacting their own terrorist activities, directed at both Muslims and pro-
governmental Europeans. 
 The end of the war came with the “Generals’ Putsch”, which marked the turning 
point of the official attitude toward the Algerian war. The leaders of this movement, who 
were French generals who had been banned or transferred from Algeria and supported the 
continuation of the war, formed the Organisation Armée Secrete, or OAS, and intended to 
seize control of Algeria and topple the de Gaulle regime. The organization garnered the 
support of the colon population and, although fear swept both France and Algeria, the 
putsch was terminated after four days. Despite the collapse of the revolt, the organization 
continued to thrive and began to commit violent attacks against both Muslims and 
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government employees, in the hopes of promoting its objective of resisting Algerian 
disengagement. It was after this event that de Gaulle became “prepared to abandon the 
colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off” (Metz 
1994, 54). Talks with the FLN opened at Évian and a cease fire took effect on March 19, 
1962. On July 1, 1962 nearly 6 million of the total 6.5 million Algerian electorate “cast 
their ballots in the referendum on independence and the vote was nearly unanimous” 
(Metz 1994, 55); two days later the President of France declared Algeria a free nation.  
 The total cost of the War for Independence has been an issue of contention for 
years. The FLN estimated that nearly three hundred thousand individuals had died during 
the eight year revolution, yet Algerian sources later raised that figure to nearly 1.5 million 
people. The French claimed that their losses totaled to eighteen thousand individuals with 
over ten thousand Europeans dying in forty-two thousand recorded terrorist incidents 
(Metz 1994, 55). There was also a mass exodus of colons after the signing of the truce 
and, at the end of the subsequent year, fewer than thirty thousand Europeans chose to 
remain in Algeria. Yet it was not simply the material destruction of land, the collapse of 
the economy, or loss of life that impacted the country. Even after Algerian independence 
the relationship between Algeria and France has been tense. With an intertwining of 
interests yet distinct differences, Algeria celebrates the day it received its independence, 
whereas France did not even publicly acknowledge that a war was fought in Algeria until 
1999. Within the country of Algeria itself, the war for independence legitimized the use 
of unrestricted force to obtain a justifiable goal. The determination of the FLN to regain 
sovereignty would be repeated thirty years later in the Algerian Civil War, with its 
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determination to hold onto the position in the government and the extreme force that 
would be used to achieve its goals. 
The Lasting Impacts of French Colonialism on Modern-day Algeria 
 The effects of French colonialism on modern day Algeria are numerous in the 
social, economic, and political sectors, yet there are also differences that cannot be 
quantified. When Algiers first fell in 1830, the systematic confiscation of land and the 
increasing inflation due to the introduction of the French currency led to “the rise of the 
modern Algerian proletariat” (Bennoune 1988, 37). These individuals suddenly had no 
other means of survival than to hire out their labor on a day-to-day basis. Some Algerians 
feel that, “colonization resulted in the expropriation of most of the Algerian producers as 
well as in the deconstruction-transformation of both the pre-existing urban system and the 
rural landscape” (Bennoune 1988, 39). It was not simply the urban areas that felt the 
impact of French colonization; “rural colonization was the most important single factor in 
the destruction of traditional society” (Metz 1994, 24). The seizures of land from the 
countryside undermined Algeria’s pre-colonial economic and social systems and those 
individuals who had sustained themselves with the field of agriculture were no longer 
able to do so when the “primary natural resources were taken from the native producers” 
(Bennoune 1988, 52). In addition to the rise of a proletariat class was the formation of an 
Algerian upper-middle class with the évolués. Receiving a French education, this group 
of individuals formed the foundations of political resistance and began the establishment 
of political movements that would become so divisive to Algerian life in later years. 
 Not only did the French alter Algeria’s economic and social structure but they 
also impacted Algerians’ religious viewpoints and morals concerning war. Firstly, the 
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Arab-Islamic identity became completely separate from life in Algeria. The French 
indirectly closed all Islamic schools by refusing them funding and asked Algerians to 
relinquish their Muslim identity in order to gain French citizenship. Few Muslims were 
willing to go to such lengths and, as a result, the foundations of a more extreme religious 
sect were laid. The Algerians further embraced their religion and morals due to the 
frequency and intensity of war crimes both in the French plan of colonization and the 
Algerians’ struggle for independence. During the 1800s the French adopted strategies 
such as “scorched earth”, where they burned everything down, or “smoke out”, where 
they trapped and burned soldiers in caves (Bennoune 1988, 40). These war crimes, “were 
not committed because the ethical standards of the 19th century Frenchmen had 
degenerated; they were motivated by the firm conviction that the colonization of Algeria 
would be in the best interests of France” (Bennoune 1988, 40). This is an important result 
of French colonization because it laid the foundation of the ideology of the FLN, which 
was the belief that extreme violence was justifiable if it resulted in political success. 
 The French and Algerians’ relationship is one that has been so detrimental to both 
countries yet ties will never be completely severed. The violent history between the two 
cannot be denied although some French and American historians have downplayed the 
events that occurred during that hundred year period. The French had a massive impact 
on their colony, some good, such as the exposure to democracy and political movements, 
and other negative, such as the justification for extreme violence. Although it was solely 
the Algerians who caused the civil war that tore their nation apart, it is important to 
understand the history of colonial Algeria and the foundations that the French laid that 
allowed such a conflict to come about.  
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Chapter 2: The Algerian Civil War, 1954-1962 
Prior to the start of the war in 1954, it was difficult to separate the countries of 
France and Algeria. The colony of Algeria constituted three French departments and as 
the French Minister of the Interior said, “Algeria is France” (Stora 2001, 30). After 125 
years of controlling Algeria the invested interest between the two nations was great; 
nearly one million Europeans had moved to the North African country to establish a new 
life and many Muslims had rushed to aid the French in both World Wars. With the 
immigration of Algerians to France came a new understanding of socialist ideas, 
however, and the desire for independence began to grow. 
 The French Republic saw itself as assimilationist yet millions of Muslim 
Algerians felt that their citizenship was a sham since they voted in a college that was 
separate from the Europeans (Stora 2001, 30). Muslims were beginning to feel that total 
independence would be the only way to fully undo the unfair treatment and policies of 
the French. Political parties, such as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic 
Liberties (MTLD) which were pro-independence through peaceful means, became 
divided and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) formed with the goal of using force 
to obtain Algerian self-determination. This distinct separation in ideology forever 
changed the history of Algeria. 
The Members and Doctrine of the Front de Libération Nationale 
 Prior to November 1, 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was a 
relatively unknown association that was guided by a group of young individuals who 
were rebelling against French colonialism. The actions of the All Saints’ Day attack was 
conducted internally by six men: Larbi Ben M’Hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitat, 
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Krim Belkacem, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mostefa Ben Boulaid (Stora 2001, 36). There 
was also a movement outside of Algeria, in Cairo, which was led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, 
Ahmed Ben Bella, and Mohammed Khider (Stora 2001, 36). They were all originally 
members of the Parti du Peuple (PPA), and later the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des 
Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), and had contributed to the group’s efforts to mobilize 
the working class in Algeria and use political action to combat colonization. These young 
activists became “advocates of armed struggle and clashed violently with the old head of 
the PPA, Messali Hadj”, leading to the creation of the FLN (Stora 2001, 36). Many of the 
individuals who shaped the FLN were educated men who came from well-known rural 
families that were becoming “affected by the general downward mobility at work in 
Algerian society” (Stora 2001, 37). Several of the original leaders had also fought as 
French soldiers during World War II and their formal training allowed them to 
understand “intimately the strengths and weaknesses of the French military”, a fact that 
was greatly to their advantage and aided their success (Millen 2008, 36). They hailed 
from various regions in Algeria, including Marnia, Kabyle, and Constantine. They also 
had differing backgrounds; Ben Bella was a merchant’s son who rose to the rank of 
Sergeant-Major in the French army, Hocine Ait Ahmed was the son of a Kabyle lawyer 
and a formidable orator, and Mohammed Boudiaf was also a French army veteran who 
was afflicted with chronic tuberculosis from a young age (Evans 2007, 54). With such 
diversity, the organization was founded on a policy of collective leadership, which once 
again worked to its advantage since it became much more difficult for the French to 
isolate and target so many individuals. These men changed the general outlook on 
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Algerian independence, feeling that slow, collective work was outdated and ineffective 
and that one must turn to military action to gain results. 
 The radical movement of the FLN was a result of both French and Islamic 
influences. The first pro-independence activists were based in Paris and their “French 
experience taught them the models of organization and the rudiments of socialist 
ideology by which they would analyze the situation of their nation…it put them in 
contact with industrial and urban models of life” (Stora 2001, 65). Another factor to 
consider during this time is that almost all Algerians were faithful to their religious 
customs. “Islam was both a combat ideology and a social project” and took the form of a 
nationalist philosophy (Stora 2001, 66). An example of this can be found in the text of a 
tract that was broadcast on Radio Cairo following the first attacks. The tract introduced 
the people of Algeria to the FLN and stated the goal of the FLN as “National 
Independence through the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and 
social, within the framework of the principles of Islam” (Evans 2007, 57). One of the 
internal objectives also stated in the same document was the “pursuit of North African 
unity in its national Arab-Islamic context” (Evans 2007, 57). The party was aware of the 
contradictions that existed within this theory but used the main goal of independence as a 
means of deflecting questioning. 
The Start of the “Phony War” (1954-1955) and the French Reforms that Followed 
 Early on the morning of November 1, 1954, Algeria plunged into a battle for its 
freedom. Across the country there were over thirty simultaneous attacks on military or 
police targets from the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), otherwise known as the 
military branch of the FLN, which had little more than four hundred miscellaneous small 
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arms (Millen 2008, 28). Although the attacks resulted in the deaths of seven people, 
overall the assault on the police stations, barracks, and industrial plants did not have the 
impact that the revolutionary fighters had hoped for (Stora 2001, 35). Few weapons were 
procured and “militarily, the operation was a complete failure”; in addition the hoped-for 
popular uprising failed to follow (Millen 2008, 28). Although the ALN presented itself as 
a disorganized military operation with a small arsenal, this event was not reflective of the 
political groundwork that the FLN had already established in certain regions of Algeria.  
 The immediate response of the French to this outburst was minimal. François 
Mitterand, Minister of the Interior, sent just an additional six hundred men to be at the 
disposal of the thirty-five hundred troops who were already stationed in the colony. The 
“events”, as they were referred to in France, received little press attention, and few 
French citizens believed that their country had just entered another war (Stora 2001, 36). 
The government greatly underestimated the capabilities of the members of the FLN, 
whom they viewed simply as another tribal group, and “the misreading of the situation 
helps explain the French incremental, expedient, and short-sighted response” (Millen 
2008, 28). The French government’s actions would attempt to balance three goals: 
maintaining a strong appearance domestically for the citizens who cared little for the 
colony of Algeria, the appeasement of the colons in Algeria, and the avoidance any 
collateral damage that would anger either group of citizens.  
 Just a few short weeks after the first signs of conflict in Algeria, Tunisia and 
Morocco gained internal autonomy, leading to a greater interest and further justification 
for the work done by the members of the FLN party. It became clear that “the Arab world 
was under the influence of the Nasserian revolution” which was beginning to “shake the 
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colonial empire” (Stora 2001, 39). After the initial attack, the FLN continued with its 
provocations while the French retaliated with “mass arrests, false imprisonment, and 
collective punishment” as well as an increased military presence in the country (Millen 
2008, 29). These additional troops and military operations were accompanied by 
proposed reforms with the hopes of forming an agreement. During the month of January 
1955, the French government proposed the creation of a school administration in Algiers 
that would give Muslim Algerians access to posts of responsibility in the public sector, as 
well as the reduction of the gap in Algerian and European salaries (Europeans had a gross 
income that was twenty-eight times that of the typical Algerian citizen), the initiation of 
major public works projects, and the formal recognition of the state of economic poverty 
in many regions throughout Algeria (Stora 2001, 39). The positive changes proposed 
were barely discussed after the French deputies delivered a non-confidence vote to 
Premier Pierre Mendes-France on February 5, 1955 by a margin of 319 to 273 (Stora 
2001, 40). Political parties sided with the colons and did not approve of the changes that 
were proposed to improve the lives of the Muslim Algerians. 
 Jacques Soustelle became the new governor of Algeria; a Gaullist, he had a 
reputation as being an open and liberal man. He formed a more diverse cabinet and his 
willingness to explore new possibilities regarding the French-Algerian relationship made 
him unpopular amongst those individuals already in power in Algiers, who feared that a 
change in the Franco-Algerian relationship would mean a loss of their power. In the first 
few months of his term, he “labored to understand the discontent of the Muslim 
population” and through his trips to the troubled regions he came to understand that this 
was not a conventional battle (Stora 2001, 40). He realized that it was going to take more 
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than military deployments to truly win this fight but his efforts were fruitless and the 
National Assembly strengthened the powers of the army and authorized the 
“displacement of contaminate populations to ‘settlement camps’” (Stora 2001, 40). These 
camps further alienated the Muslim population from the French and strengthened the 
cause of the FLN.  
The FLN Tactics During the First Years of War 
 The FLN tactics of this time differed from anything that the French had fought 
against previously and their underestimation in conjunction with sincere 
misunderstanding led to military mistakes. Initially the sentiments of the FLN were not 
shared throughout the entire Algerian Muslim population. It was not through the power of 
persuasion that the Muslims came to side with and aid the FLN, but rather scare tactics. 
FLN members would extort food and funds from the civilians and use “acts of terror to 
intimidate the inhabitants into silence”, including the mutilation of French loyalist and 
the elimination of Muslim moderates (Millen 2008, 29). This did not go unnoticed by the 
French and throughout his trips, Jacques Soustelle observed that “the FLN ‘never sought 
to attach the rural populations to their cause by promising them a better life, a happier 
and freer future; no, it was through terror that they submitted to their tyranny’” (Millen 
2008, 29). This practice was started from the onset of fighting and continued throughout 
the entire war. 
 Although the majority, approximately eighty-six percent, of the FLN was Muslim 
the organization showed no difference in its policy towards a moderate or pro-French 
Muslim and the actual colonists; in its eyes an enemy was an enemy and its treatment 
towards them was unforgiving. In many cases the final initiation requirement to join the 
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FLN was the assassination of a government official or informant. The mutilation of 
French loyalists, both Muslim and colon, was also a common practice that served to 
belittle the enemy (Millen 2008, 29). This served as a scare tactic which forced other 
Muslims to support the FLN cause. 
 At the start of the conflict there were Muslims who were more moderate in nature 
and were willing to meet and negotiate with the French. One of the first acts of the FLN 
was to eliminate these Muslim moderates because it did not want “any moderate 
interlocutors available for the French to negotiate peace” (Millen 2008, 29). At the end of 
the war it was estimated that almost sixty-nine thousand Muslims were killed by the ALN 
and that many of these losses were a result of internal purges (Stora 2001, 110). The few 
moderates who remained joined the FLN after a few years due to their shock at the 
extreme nature of the French response. In addition to removing the moderate Muslims, 
the FLN strategically planned its attacks with the intention of severing European contact 
with the Muslim population (Millen 2008, 29). The French no longer communicated to 
and trusted the Muslim population, unable to be sure which individuals were members of 
the FLN, and in turn, the Algerians no longer had faith in the French since the military 
responded with such harsh, collective reprisals. These tactics were extremely effective 
and caused huge setbacks for the French. They were shocked at the success and number 
of the attacks by the FLN and as a result they disarmed many citizens for fear that the 
weapons would be given to the militants. This plan backfired and left the general 
population defenseless against the FLN; with no other option many soon aided the 
militant organization.  
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The Change from a “Phony War” to a Full Conflict, Philippeville 1955 
 After several months of conflict it appeared that the strength of the FLN was 
beginning to wane under the continuous military strikes by the French. The leaders of the 
Constantinois region felt that the Algerian population needed a boost in spirits and that 
the revolution needed momentum. They decided that, “collective reprisals against 
Europeans, military or civilian, should be used as a reply to the colonial policy of 
collective response” (Hutchinson 1978, 50). The FLN adopted this policy in August 1955 
and in essence “raised the level of the conflict” by broadening the scope of their attacks 
to include civilians (Millen 2008, 29). Until the clash at Philippeville, the FLN had 
performed “ambushes and night raids” on army patrols, military encampments, police 
posts, and transportation and communications facilities (Metz 1994, 48); rarely, if ever, 
did it attack European civilians.  
 On August 20, 1955, thousands of Algerian peasants revolted in over thirty 
villages within the four main cities of Collo, Philippeville, Constantine, and Guelma. The 
initial intention of the events was to mark “the second anniversary of the deposing of Sidi 
Mohammed Ben Youcef, sultan of Morocco, by the French” (Stora 2001, 43). At first the 
attacks focused mostly on police stations, the military, and various government buildings, 
yet soon the thousands of peasants and agricultural workers began performing acts of 
violence against citizens. Many “French people, but also Muslims, were murdered with 
axes, billhooks, picks, or knives” and various political figures were attacked (Millen 
2001, 43). This escalation of violence resulted in the deaths of one hundred and twenty 
three people, seventy-one of whom were European. After this event the French would 
severely increase their tactics for defeating the FLN.  
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 The French response was immediate, collective, and extremely violent. Soustelle 
declared a state of emergency and the French government “ceded its political authority to 
the military leadership in Algeria” as a way of ending the insurgency by any means 
(Millen 2008, 30). The weakening of political direction and constraints on military 
strategy “virtually undercut any political settlement of the insurgency” (Millen 2008, 30). 
France sent sixty thousand reservists to Algeria and private militias were formed; and, 
rather than solely attacking the FLN, the French continued to enact a policy of collective 
responsibility. In the end the official death toll was 1,273 although the FLN claims that 
the actual figure was 12,000 persons who were missing or dead in the following weeks 
(Hutchinson 1978, 51). Overnight the war changed from a mild conflict to a severe battle. 
The initial goal of the Philippeville attacks, which was to incite a massive 
Algerian uprising, failed to transpire yet overall the results were successful. The actions 
of August 1955 were considered “a major event which led many hesitant Muslims to opt 
for the FLN” (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Those few moderate Muslims who had not been 
removed in the first months of the war now viewed the FLN as a serious organization that 
was “representative of a Muslim population, which now aspired to independence rather 
than assimilation or integration” (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Moderate Muslims renounced 
negotiations and joined the FLN in favor of full confrontation (MSN Encarta, “Algerian 
War of Independence, 2008). The possibility for negotiations was no longer seemed like 
a viable or popular option by either side. 
Changes in French Government and Military Tactics Following Philippeville  
 The actions of the FLN at Philippeville resulted in changes in the French 
government. Four days after the initial attack in August 1955, sixty thousand soldiers 
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who had recently been released from duty were recalled to service in Algeria and on 
August 30 “the government decreed that 180,000 dischargeable soldiers would remain in 
the military” (Stora 2001, 44). Instantly the soldiers and their families began protests 
across France and although they claimed to have the encouragement of the French 
civilians, the lack of actual support caused the protests to be short lived. During this time 
individuals as well as major organizations and political parties were more “preoccupied 
with the tumult of political life within France” and with good reason (Stora 2001, 45). On 
November 29 the Assembly passed a no-confidence vote on the current French 
government, resulting in its dissolution. This vote, with a margin of 318 to 218, was not 
directly linked to Philippeville but rather a number of issues that were plaguing France at 
the time.  
 Within Algeria during this time there was also an uprooting of the current 
government. The government decided to postpone elections until there was a more stable 
situation. It was also during this time that the elected officials in Ferhat Abbas’ Union 
Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, one of the few moderate organizations to survive 
the FLN’s purge, resigned from the Algerian assembly. This was following in the 
footsteps of the sixty-one Muslim officials who had already left in opposition to 
Soustelle.  
 The French elections were held on January 2, 1956 and the Front Républicain, a 
new party formed by Socialists and Radicals, surprisingly won fifty-two out of six 
hundred and twenty-three seats. The Communists also won fifty seats; the landscape of 
the French government was beginning to change. On February 1, Guy Mollet, a French 
Socialist of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière Party, became the Premier 
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under the new government. The next day Jacques Soustelle, who had arrived in Algeria 
as a relatively unpopular Premier, left the country as thousands of Europeans 
demonstrated their affection. A few days later, Mollet arrived with a neutral policy and a 
desire to find peaceful negotiations. He was met with a demonstration by supporters of a 
French Algeria and five days later “abandoned his policy” of peace (Stora 2001, 46). 
Soon after Pierre Mendes-France, an individual who was against colonialism, resigned 
his post as State Minister; this new Socialist-led government would lead France into a 
fully-fledged war.  
 The colon extremists and military personnel viewed this new government as an 
opportunity to increase French manpower in Algeria, which was already totaling 190,000 
soldiers by that time. Robert Lacoste was quickly appointed Minister Resident in Algeria 
and introduced a bill in the National Assembly “authorizing the government to set in 
place a program of economic expansion, social progress, and administrative reform in 
Algeria, and enabling it to take all exceptional measures in view of reestablishing order, 
protecting persons and property, and safeguarding the territory” (Stora 2001, 46). What 
followed were decrees that allowed the increase of military action and the recall of 
reservists as well as a law which established special powers that suspended most of the 
guarantees of individual liberties in Algeria; by stripping individuals of their civil 
liberties, a total and complete war could now be fought without effect on one’s 
conscience. 
 With the recall of reservists, tens of thousands of soldiers made their way into 
Algeria; this allowed the French to change their strategy vis-à-vis to the FLN. Algeria 
was divided into three different sections: a zone of operation, a pacification zone, and a 
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forbidden zone (Stora 2001, 46). Each zone had a specific army corps and goal: the 
forces of the operation zone were meant to destroy the rebels; the soldiers within the 
pacification zone oversaw the protection of the European and Muslim populations; and 
the forbidden zones were evacuated, with their populations being sent to camps that were 
run by the army. Although this strategy of concentrating the troops was effective overall, 
it took time for these new troops to become accustomed to the harsh terrain and 
unconventional battle tactics. 
The Introduction of “Revolutionary Terrorism” by the FLN 
The FLN did have two alternatives during this time and could have either “sought 
the tolerance of at least some part of the European population or treated Europeans as a 
monolithic enemy and concentrated on gaining Algerian approval” (Hutchinson 1978, 
53). The unwillingness of the FLN to accept anything less than total independence made 
the latter the only viable option. Events of late 1955 and early 1956, including the French 
capture of Ben Bella, an increase in European violence against Algerians, and continued 
military repression, created a situation where the FLN would have been unable to win 
European neutrality even if the Muslim population had desired it (Hutchinson 1978, 53). 
The FLN had already been organizing events of compliance terrorism (terrorism directed 
at Muslims to obtain compliance) as well as isolation terrorism (terrorism meant to 
isolate Muslim and European communities) and organizational terrorism (terrorism 
directed at Muslims to strengthen the FLN) (Prochaska 1980, 132). With the subsequent 
events of Philippeville and the increase in French violence, the party now implemented a 
policy of endorsement terrorism, a variety of terrorism designed to target the Europeans 
with the hope of gaining the support of the Muslims (Prochaska 1980, 132). This new 
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type of endorsement terrorism continued to strengthen the position of the FLN within 
Algeria and proved to be multifunctional; it directed Algerians to side with the FLN 
cause, created insecurity among colonists, and weakened the French government. 
This new policy of actions frequently led to indiscriminate and violent French 
reactions. The FLN was getting closer to its overall goal, which was to force the French 
to react in a more brutal manner and subsequently convincing more Muslims to support 
the FLN, regardless of whether the reaction from their plans came from the military or 
the European civilians. With these violent responses came a greater polarization between 
the European and the Muslim populations and the furthering of Algerian support for self-
determination. With their increasing isolation, the French became more insecure and this 
“fear and anger was expressed in hostility and irrational violence towards Algerians”, 
creating a continuous chain that resulted in an increased support for the FLN (Hutchinson 
1978, 54). The fear that existed among the French colonial population would result in 
serious consequences near the end of the war. 
Total War in Algeria, 1956 
 On March 16, 1956, only four days after the special powers vote that stripped 
Algerians of their liberties, Algiers suffered attacks from the FLN. Lacoste immediately 
imposed a curfew on the city and increased France’s military presence there. As the year 
continued “terrorism took root nearly everywhere” and initially the French suffered many 
casualties as they put their plan of the quadrillage system, a method of dividing a counter-
insurgency terrain into sections as a means of isolating the people within while searching 
the enclosed area for insurgents, into action (Stora 2001, 47). Although the early failures 
caused the French public to become “acutely aware of the war in Algeria”, the French 
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response became increasingly successful and inflicted 13,899 casualties on the FLN over 
the span of nine months (Millen 2008, 31).  
 Throughout the year there were many terrorist attacks which were spearheaded by 
the FLN and resulted in counter-terrorist attacks by the French. Examples of this can be 
found in the French decision to begin executing the captured FLN prisoners in June and 
the decision for troops in August to bomb a house in the Algiers Casbah, resulting in at 
least seventy Algerian casualties (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The French response of 
counterterrorism to the FLN attacks created a situation where “the terrorist commandos 
were practically forced to act to satisfy popular calls for vengeance”, the goal of 
endorsement terrorism, even though the French tried to defend itself, insisting that the 
FLN struck first with its bomb attacks (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The FLN responded with 
an attack where two time bombs were placed in two restaurants in the European center of 
Algiers; the explosions left two dead and sixty injured (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The 
Algerians expressed a general enthusiasm for these actions and were “offended by 
European indifference to counterterrorism and outraged by the execution of prisoners” 
(Hutchinson 1978, 57). The cycle of violence, particularly in Algiers, would always be 
justified as an act of retaliation, resulting in an inevitable cyclical effect where neither 
party acknowledged its own responsibilities. 
 The relatively successful operations of the French could have possibly been 
enough to end the war in victory, yet as the year came to an end the focus became 
diverted to the Suez War and the annihilation of Nasser. The FLN took full “advantage of 
these events to make its presence known in the countryside and in the cities” (Stora 2001, 
48). They took the repressive actions of the French army and used them to recruit 
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thousands of young Algerians toward their guerilla forces; by the end of 1956 the ALN 
had “tens of thousands of warriors in its ranks” (Stora 2001, 48). Guy Mollet appointed 
General Raoul Salan as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Algerian forces; a veteran of 
Indochina, his leadership would cause France to enter a new phase in the Algerian War.  
A Further Increase in Violent Tactics, The Battle of Algiers, 1957 
 On December 27, 1956 Amédée Froger, the President of the Association of 
European Mayors and an unofficial spokesman for the colons, was murdered in Algiers. 
The following day at his funeral, there was a massive outbreak of violence against the 
Arab population, which the French police failed to control due to their sympathy with the 
colons’ cause. Tensions between the colons and the Muslims were at an all-time high and 
the Algerian general government decided to act. Due to the “special powers” law that had 
been passed in March 1956, Lacoste was able to “entrust the pacification of Algiers to the 
Commander of the Tenth Paratroopers’ Division” (Stora 2001, 49). On January 7, 1957 
eight thousand paratroopers occupied the city and the “Battle of Algiers” began. 
 The violence was immediate and widespread within the city and the practice of 
torture and excess was committed by both parties. During this time the ALN carried out 
an average of 800 shootings and bombings per month (Metz 1994, 49). In theory one can 
differentiate between provocation terrorism and vengeance terrorism, yet with the Battle 
of Algiers it was sometimes difficult to separate the two, in either the case of the French 
or of the FLN. An example can be found in an event with the following FLN explanation: 
January 22, 1957, the Algiers-Kolea bus was attacked, at 6:30 pm, by a 
group of the ALN. The European passengers were executed. After the 
burial of one of them, a sergeant living at Fouka, the racist militia of that 
locality kidnapped and killed six Algerians… Why did the ALN conduct 
this daring raid and proceed to these executions? The reason is simple. 
Kolea is the seat of a military school and a battalion of paratroopers. 
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Before the attack on the bus…a grenade was thrown on a paratrooper 
patrol. During the night they descended to the Arab town ‘after a loss of 
control’. Led by the territorials, they forced their way into houses that they 
pillaged before ‘cleaning them out’ with grenades or knives. The number 
of victims, including several women, is almost sixty. Sixteen girls were 
raped (Hutchinson 1978, 59).  
 
Another example can be found in May 1957 when FLN terrorists killed two paratroopers; 
in response the French army killed or wounded eighty Algerians (Hutchinson 1978, 56). 
Uncontrolled reprisals “against the Algerian population were almost as common in the 
army as they were in the European civilian population” (Hutchinson 1978, 56). An 
example can be found on January 26 when two charges exploded in the bar L’Otomatic 
and the café Le Coq Hardi; two Muslim Algerians were lynched by a European mob in 
response (Stora 2001, 49). In June 1957 an FLN bombing of the Casino de la Corniche 
killed eight and wounded forty-five. In reply, six Algerians were killed and forty five 
were wounded in addition to the twenty cars that were burned and the hundred Algerian 
stores that were pillaged (Hutchinson 1978, 55). The severity of the colon and military 
action caused problems for France both within its domestic population and the 
international arena. 
 The events in Algeria caught the attention of the international community after 
two years of violence. There were many countries, especially those with a history of 
colonizing other nations, which accepted the French position but not their specific 
policies. Others, such as Tunisia and Morocco, were providing the FLN with weapons 
and reinforcements. The “Algerian Question” was placed on the agenda for the United 
Nations General Assembly sessions in January 1957. In preparation, the FLN sent 
delegations to Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the United States, China, India, and 
Latin America.  
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Prior to the UN conference, Britain and the United States, “wanted the French to 
accept a more innocuous resolution on Algeria rather than a confrontational approach” 
(Alexander 2002, 167). Mollet responded to this request by saying that he could not “go 
any further towards independence without provoking a revolution in Algiers, which 
would be backed by a considerable portion of the French Army” (Alexander 2002, 168). 
The powers that were given to the colon population in France now restricted the actions 
of the French government and risked the international alienation of France; this would 
foreshadow the events of the Generals’ Putsch, which came later in the war.  
On January 28, 1957, with the hopes of influencing the United Nations debate on 
the “Algerian Question”, the FLN organized an eight-day strike in Algiers in which many 
workers and businesses participated. Although General Massu used the paratroopers to 
break the strike and systematically destroy the FLN infrastructure in Algiers, the event 
showed that the FLN had the capability to rally a mass response and exemplified its 
appeal among the Muslim population.  
After the strike the city was divided into sections and “the Muslim neighborhoods 
were isolated behind barbed wire, under searchlights” (Stora 2001, 49). Massu’s men 
made “massive arrests, systematically took down names, and in ‘transit and sorting 
centers’, located on the periphery of the city, practiced torture” (Stora 2001, 50). The 
French released stories of FLN leadership mysteriously “committing suicide” after 
undergoing interrogations. Despite their questionable morality, the methods of using 
electrodes, dunking suspects in bathtubs, and severely beating them were effective and 
the FLN’s sub-organization in Algiers, the ZAA, was destroyed while attacks were 
reduced by nearly seventy-five percent in less than two months.  
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The French military’s means of obtaining information and results were not 
popular with many of the soldiers who were forced to enact them. For many of them, they 
would live with those “nightmares for the rest of their lives” (Stora 201, 50). On March 
28, 1957 General Paris de Bollardière asked to be relieved of his duties in Algeria 
because he simply could not endorse torture after his experiences with the Nazis the 
previous decade. Massu’s Paratrooper’s Division responded by declaring, “One cannot 
fight against revolutionary war except with methods of clandestine action” (Stora 2001, 
50). Paul Teitgen, the Secretary General of the Algiers police, resigned and spoke out 
against the practices of General Massu; he claimed that 3,024 individuals had 
disappeared during the Battle of Algiers (Stora 2001, 50). Despite these horrible 
practices, the paratroopers had the support of the colon population and Yacef Saadi, 
leader of the ZAA, was arrested at the end of September while his assistant committed 
suicide; the Battle of Algiers had finally come to an end.  
The War amongst the Algerian Muslim Population and the Expansion of the FLN 
 It is important to pause for a moment and discuss the internal war that was 
occurring between Algerian political factions during this time. With the start of the 
Algerian War on November 1, 1954 there was no single structure or leadership within the 
organization of the FLN. On November 4, 1954 the Council of Ministers disbanded the 
Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) which was headed by 
Messali Hadj and was meant to replace the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). Several 
hundred nationalist leaders were arrested and those who were not, were forced to hide 
underground or join the guerilla forces. The FLN intended to benefit from the MTLD’s 
dissolution and established “structures to intercept the majority of disoriented Messalists” 
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as well as take ownership of the weapons that they possessed and their connections 
abroad (Stora 2001, 57). Messali Hadj was adamantly against the start of the Algerian 
War and established the MNA or Mouvement National Algérien which was the only 
socialist faction to not eventually join the FLN’s cause.  
 There was a very clear differentiation between the “activists”, who formed the 
FLN, and the “Messalists”, who became members of the MNA, resulting in a struggle to 
gain the support of the “centralists”, which would lead the two organizations to violent 
confrontation in late 1955. During the first year of the war against the French, the FLN 
printed an assortment of propaganda directed at the MNA. The leader of the FLN in 
Algiers printed a pamphlet in which he referred to Messali Hadj as a “shame-faced old 
man who holds the Angoulême front, at the head of an army of police officers, which 
assures his protection against the anger of the people” (Stora 2001, 59). On December 10, 
after a year of passive verbal exchanges and propaganda, two FLN militants executed 
Sadek Rihani, the leader of the MNA in Algiers. For the rest of the war there existed an 
internal civil war that unfolded in both France and Algeria. The “‘shock commandos’ of 
the FLN and MNA waged a long, cruel battle using every means possible: traps, betrayal, 
infiltration, and executions to serve as an example, all of them sowing fear” (Stora 2001, 
59). The especially brutal of actions of the FLN caused MNA supporters to turn and join 
the French forces. By the end of 1962, it was would be predicted that within France, the 
nationalist conflict would result in four thousand deaths, twelve thousand assaults, and 
over nine thousand injuries; the numbers within Algeria would be larger, with six 
thousand dead and over fourteen thousand wounded (Stora 2001, 59). The FLN would 
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emerge triumphant but at the expense of ten thousand dead civilians and a lack of a more 
moderate voice in Algeria’s post-war government. 
 During the first two years of the war, the FLN reached out and increased 
discussions with other divisions of the pro-independence movement yet despite these 
efforts, it expected the other parties to simply disband and their members to join its cause. 
Many of the centralists slowly joined the FLN, including Ferhat Abbas’ UDMA, which 
joined forces with the FLN after the Philippeville massacre. The FLN was able to obtain 
such support through the approval of the religious ulama, which “glorified the resistance 
to colonialism” (Stora 2001, 60). Even the Algerian Communists were incorporated into 
the FLN on July 1, 1956 (Stora 2001, 60). The unification of the political organizations 
naturally led to a strengthening of public support for complete independence.  
The Soummam Congress, which was held on August 20, 1956, made official the 
dissolution of all other parties, including the ulama and UDMA. The twenty-day 
conference was based on the “assertion of the civil over the political… Its intention was 
to endow the FLN with formal structures and a clear chain of political command” (Evans 
2007, 64). The Congress formed a thirty-four member Conseil National de la Révolution 
Algérienne, which was to be the ruling body of the FLN and serve as a sort of 
parliamentary skeleton. This structure of collective leadership placed an emphasis on 
domestic issues. The sixteen men that congregated also gave a full assessment of their 
material capabilities and plans were formed to strengthen weapons supply operations. 
This led to a complete overhaul of the ALN, with the restructuring of Algerian territories 
and the formation of a regular army, including a very fixed hierarchy. This meeting was 
the only of its kind but it laid the groundwork for the future government of Algeria.  
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The Disintegration of the Fourth Republic of France and the Continuation of War 
 Entering the third year of the conflict, France was faced with a growing number 
of problems, including a deteriorating relationship with other nations as well as the colon 
population. A number of foreign countries, including the United Kingdom and the United 
States, had begun to aid the FLN by providing Tunisia with weapons and funds. The 
French government also considered shortening the length of military service during this 
time because of its immense confidence in programs such as the electric barrier, known 
as the Morice Line. This electrified, barbed-wire fence spanned over one hundred and 
fifty miles across the Algerian-Tunisia border and was meant to prevent Tunisia guerillas 
from entering the colony. Any break in the wires was instantly registered on control 
panels in French military posts and brought detachments of troops to the area. Although 
these measures were extremely effective, it isolated Algeria, angering many of the 
colons. On March 13, police officers violently protested in Paris and a month later 
individuals who were beginning to crack under the pressures of the UN were voted out of 
the government (Stora 2001, 70). The fall of the franc, the lack of power in the 
administration, and the foreign trade deficit only added to the problems facing the 
government. 
 There was speculation for months regarding what or who was needed to restore 
France back to its prior greatness. One name that became increasingly popular was 
General Charles de Gaulle. A veteran of both World Wars, de Gaulle was Prime Minister 
of France’s Provisional Government in 1944 and he retired two years later following 
political conflicts. To “the army and settlers he presented himself as the man to save 
Algeria, while to the public at large he cast himself as the only bulwark against a military 
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takeover” (Evans 2007, 61). He had wonderful political instincts and although many 
people supported his candidacy, General de Gaulle waited to take control in an attempt to 
establish a new French government with increased presidential powers. After nearly a 
month of protests, killings, and threats within Algeria, the situation had become out of 
control and Robert Lacoste was called to Paris. A huge riot in Algiers trapped the French 
leadership and forced them to “facilitate General de Gaulle’s accession to power”; two 
days later the General announced that he was “ready to assume the powers of the 
Republic” (Stora 2001, 71). On May 26 the premier was convinced to resign and General 
de Gaulle’s investiture by the assembly occurred on June 1 (Metz 1994, 52). Three days 
later he traveled to Algeria where he declared, “I have understood you” (Metz 1994, 52). 
He proposed measures to improve the economic, social, and political status of the 
Muslims but at the same time gave hope to the colons and military for a future of 
assimilation. Very quickly he put forth a distinct plan and wanted to bring together both 
the Muslims and the Europeans; interestingly, he “banished from his speeches the 
expressions ‘French Algeria’ and ‘integration’” (Stora 2001, 73). On September 28, 1958 
both Europeans and Muslim men and women voted in favor of the constitution of the 
Fifth Republic. During this time de Gaulle promised fifteen billion francs for public 
works and urban development in Algeria as well as a new plan for Muslim education. He 
was voted the first President of the Fifth Republic on December 21, 1958. The actions of 
General de Gaulle throughout the year, including offering pardons for the convicts in the 
FLN, caused concern amongst the pied noir, or colons, population.  
 By the middle of the 1959, after serious pressures from the international 
community and tremendous losses for the French, General de Gaulle declared that self-
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determination must be the course that France pursues in the war. This came after the 
President began the year by ordering the army to perform the “harshest blows against the 
FLN” (Stora 2001, 75). The French started to once again make military progress and 
killed many of the higher level officials within the FLN framework. They also placed 
many Algerians in internment camps; by the end of the war nearly two million people 
had been displaced (Stora 2001, 75). Although de Gaulle initially gained much support 
from the colon and military populations, he understood that they were a large “part of 
rather than the solution to the insurgency problem” (Millen 2008, 33). He used the 
military push to create a situation where the French would have a favorable position in 
negotiation talks and did so by reducing the ALN troops in half by the end of the year 
(Millen 2008, 33). The President had created a situation where he was able to offer 
Algeria a moderate government with close ties to France but he did not anticipate the 
response from the European population. 
The Colon and Military Response to Self-Determination 
 As the possibility of independence became clearer, Europeans began to fear for 
their future. The colons were outnumbered nine to one by the Muslim population and 
they knew that their lives in Algeria were finished once France pulled out their troops; 
they began to experience a “great panic” (Stora 2001, 77). On January 24, 1960 the colon 
activists, who were fearful that the French policy was beginning to waver, clashed with 
the gendarmes. These activists set up an entrenched camp in the name of French Algeria 
and called on the army and European community to support them (Stora 2001, 77). 
Although the rioters surrendered in the beginning of February, there had been suspicious 
activity by some officials within the French military against the French government. This 
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event, which would come to be known as “Barricades Week”, exposed some wavering 
within the command and military.  
 By the spring of 1960 the French army believed that it had won the war and on 
June 25 the FLN and the French government opened their first set of negotiations. 
Although nothing resulted from these talks, they brought an enormous hope to France for 
“peace and the return of the contingent” (Stora 2001, 79). Pressure grew from the 
international community, with Algerian leaders traveling across the world to garner the 
support of the UN. France’s African allies called for the country to recognize the nation’s 
right to self-determination as well. Even within France, people were uneasy with the 
prospect of forcing their imperialist views against the citizens’ free-will. Fifty-three youth 
movements in France came together and set forth a common position of wishing to see 
the war end. Other political organizations in France also banded together and signed a 
declaration wishing to see the start of negotiations. People were coming to the realization 
that there was no longer a possibility of re-establishing a pre-war Algeria.  
 The FLN was able to recover “through politics and diplomacy all the ground lost 
by the use of force” and on January 8, 1961, President de Gaulle submitted his policy of 
self determination to a referendum vote which passed overwhelmingly; negotiations were 
set to open on April 7 in Evian (Stora 2001, 77). It was at this time that General Salan, 
who had been banished from Algeria, organized the Organisation Armée Secrete, or 
OAS, to perform a counterrevolution led by the army and colons. General Maurice 
Challe, who had been transferred after suspicious activity during Barricades Week, 
secretly arrived in Algiers, along with Salan and two other generals, to launch a coup 
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d’état. The army had promised a French Algeria and it refused to give in to the country’s 
desire for self-determination. 
 On April 21, 1961, the Green Berets, or special forces of the French Navy, 
“marched on Algiers and seized the general government, the airfield, the city hall, and the 
weapons depot” (Stora 2001, 80). Within three hours the city had fallen and the French 
government declared a state of emergency. Because it lacked the overall support of the 
army, the French President understood that the putsch would be failure and called for 
resistance by soldiers against their officers. Five days after first taking the city, Maurice 
Challe surrendered and the putsch collapsed; the OAS however, continued to thrive. 
 After the putsch General Salan went underground and gained supreme command 
of the OAS, an organization with the objective of resisting Algerian disengagement and 
constructing a new “fraternal and French Algeria” (Stora 2001, 82). With the start of 
negotiations in Evian on May 20, the OAS adopted a policy of terrorism, attacking 
Muslims and government employees to create a barrier within negotiations. The 
organization began to gain support amongst the colon population and created a cohesive 
policy in the fall 1961 with the colons’ participation. The OAS even gained some support 
within the National Assembly. It organized massive demonstrations and General Salan 
claimed that he would be able to have an army of 100,000 men for the start of the 
following year. Yet, an increase in OAS actions resulted in an increase in repression by 
both the police networks and the FLN, with a severe increase in violence.  
OAS actions became bolder as the prospect of negotiations became a clearer 
reality. Its members would be disguised as gendarmes, get prisoners released to them, and 
then execute them a few minutes later. They murdered six leaders within the academic 
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realm, including Mouloud Feraoun, a writer and friend of Albert Camus, another famous 
Algerian-born French author. The members also resorted to bazooka attacks on the 
barracks of the gendarmes and booby-trapped cars in Muslim neighborhoods. Fear 
became something that people of Algiers lived with, yet the OAS did not succeed to 
halting the pro-independence movement. 
The Evian Accords and Algerian Independence 
 After eight years of intense fighting, a cease-fire was signed on March 19, 1962 
and people in both Algeria and France rejoiced. Negotiators for the FLN made  
a few concessions regarding the rights of Europeans (dual nationality for 
three years, then the option of Algerian nationality or the status of 
privileged resident alien), control of the Sahara (preferential rights for 
French companies in the distribution of research and exploitation permits 
for six years, payment for Algerian fossil fuels in French francs), and the 
military bases (Mers el-Kebir was to remain French for a period of fifteen 
years and the installations in the Sahara for five years) (Stora 2001, 98).  
  
The French in return offered economic and financial aid to the Algerians, including sixty-
two thousand acres of land for Muslim farmers, the construction of housing for one 
million people, regular employment for four thousand new workers, schooling for all 
Algerian children within three years, and salaries and benefits equal to those in the 
metropolis (Stora 2001, 98). The agreement also took into account the French citizens 
within Algeria and required that their property rights be respected and that they have a 
fair and equal role in the government.  
 Despite this reassurance, OAS attacks continued and in fact became even more 
violent. During the month of May, “ten to fifty Algerians in Oran were slaughtered by the 
OAS on a daily basis” (Stora 2001, 100). Europeans were fleeing the cities (ten thousand 
left in May) and the FLN leaders were finding it “increasingly difficult to hold back an 
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exasperated Muslim population who wanted to strike back” (Stora 2001, 100). Many of 
the original leaders including Salan were arrested and the OAS understood that its fight 
was over and yet it refused to leave without incident. It continued to enact its policy of 
“scorched-earth”; finally at the end of June, after setting the city of Oran on fire, the 
remaining members of the OAS went into exile while thousands of Europeans continued 
to leave the country.  
 On July 1, 1962, six million voters in Algeria declared that they wanted to 
become an independent state within the guidelines of the Evian Accords; only 16,534 
voted no. After seven years of bloodshed, the Algerians rejoiced in their new-found 
autonomy yet there were still final purges and violent acts occurring within the country. 
Four days after the vote, a massive Muslim mob entered the European city of Oran and 
proceeded to hunt for anyone who remained. In the end, ninety-five people were killed, 
twenty of whom were European, and one hundred and sixty-one were wounded. In the 
end 3,080 people were abducted, of which 257 were killed (Stora 2001, 106). This was 
the last battle within French Algeria, yet another battle, one for control, was about to 
ensue in the country. 
The Consequences of War 
 The war of Algerian liberty cost both France and its former colony severe 
economic and social setbacks. It is difficult to make an accurate calculation of the 
financial costs but it has been estimated that solely during the war, France lost twenty-
seven to fifty billion francs, or ten to eighteen percent of its GDP (Stora 2001, 107). The 
various reparations were an addition seven billion and these totals do not include the 
income lost by their loss of income from Algeria. There has also been a discrepancy with 
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the total number of casualties on both sides. In 1962, the FLN estimated that nearly three 
hundred thousand people were dead from war-related causes although “Algerian sources 
later put that figure at approximately 1.5 million, while French officials estimated it at 
350,000” (Metz 1994, 55). Another estimated sixty-nine thousand Muslims were killed 
by the ALN due to internal purges (Stora 2001, 110). The French never formally released 
their losses but it is estimated that nearly twelve thousand citizens perished. These 
numbers do not include the massacre of the harkis, Muslims who aided the French, the 
Europeans, or the losses during the clashes for power after 1962. The total human loss of 
the war and its aftermath will never truly be known. 
The Less Immediate Results of the War for Independence 
 There were many aspects of the war that had residual consequences; one of these 
was the questioning and use of torture. The French army’s “use of torture has been the 
focus of public controversy since the war years, and the horrific details that emerged 
from survivors’ accounts later became inescapable reference points for an entire 
generation in France” (Hargreaves 2005, 126). At the time the use of torture, rape, and 
resettlement were given the names of social, police, or psychological operations but the 
leaders of the FLN reached out to the international community and exposed the French 
acts for what they were, making France a subject of global controversy. Stories of 
atrocities have come forth and have been verified by key military players in the conflict, 
including General Massu, who controlled the Paratroopers of Algiers. This completely 
shattered the romantic image that many French citizens had of the conflict and caused 
them to resent the amnesty laws that were passed throughout the next thirty years.  
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 Another lingering issue was that of the Algerian immigration to France during the 
years of the war; the number had doubled during that period. Most “of the immigrants 
were men” between the ages of twenty and forty who had been displaced due to French 
military policy (Stora 2001, 63). During this time nearly one million men of working age 
were unemployed in Algeria and France was in serious need of workers to replace the 
men who had been sent to fight (Stora 2001, 64). This would later become a problem 
when the immigration laws within France would tighten and people were only able to 
move to the country through family reunification. Even today, the issue of immigration, 
especially of peoples from North African countries, plagues French politics.  
 The Evian Accords assured that the new Algerian government maintained close 
ties with France; the intertwining of interests, despite very distinct differences, has led to 
the continuation of a tense relationship. Algeria continues to celebrate its independence 
from France yet the European nation chose to have a collective memory of denial; it did 
not publicly acknowledge that a war was fought until 1999. For the Algerians, the war for 
their independence justified the use of violence to obtain political success and reinforce 
the ideology of the FLN. Thirty years later, this theory would be used to validate the 
actions of the organization with their struggle to maintain their position in government 
against the FIS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 60
Chapter 3: The Algerian Civil War 
Twenty-five years after achieving independence from France, Algeria was almost 
unrecognizable, having undergone radical changes in its economic, societal, and cultural 
foundation. From the ashes of the war arose a fairly stable, single party system which was 
“legitimized by the conquest of national independence and grounded in the key 
institutions of the nationalist struggle, the party, and the army” (Mortimer, 1996, 18). 
With a new-found freedom and government, what was once a rather rural nation now had 
iron and steel complexes, oil refineries, fertilizer factories, and natural gas liquification 
plants. By the end of the 1970’s, the country was “one vast construction site where 
everywhere roads, factories, and schools were being built” (Martinez 2000, 2). Algeria 
began to invest heavily in education and health care, leading to a drop in infant mortality 
and a significant increase in the population (Pierre 1995, 134). Young Algerians, 
including women, were given increased accessibility to an education. The number of 
wage-earning jobs had increased dramatically, making the shift from 700,000 in 1963 to 
2,300,000 in 1981; to fill these positions, people began moving to urban centers (Stora 
2001, 193). These positive changes in Algerian society were relatively immediate; yet in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, the flaws in the government’s programs began to show.  
 Although the Algerian regime was able to maintain a relatively stable position for 
over a decade, its projects of industrialization and national improvements were 
overambitious; problems began to wear down the single party establishment. Beginning 
in the 1970s and into the 1980s three crises simultaneously faced the nation, the most 
obvious beginning economic (Pierre 1995, 132). The sudden increase in population and 
urbanization rates produced a housing crisis where “one million housing units would 
 61
have had to be built within ten years merely to reduce the scarcity to its 1973 level” 
(Stora 2001, 193). At this time there was an inadequacy of hydraulic equipment which 
led to water rationing in most large cities. The Algerian regime had made vast changes to 
improve the health of its citizens but it had not prepared properly for the inevitable result 
of an increased population. 
 In the late 1970s the number of unemployed began to increase and affect the 
younger generations of Algerians. In 1985, “nearly seventy-two percent of those looking 
for work were under twenty-five” and this segment of the population was a direct product 
of the “Arabized” education that the regime had tried to put forth since gaining power 
(Stora 2001, 193). The youths that were now looking for work in Algeria were of the first 
generation completely educated in the independent nation and they were barely literate in 
either Arabic or French (Pierre 1995, 134). This population of youths, unacquainted with 
the war against the French, began to become disenchanted with the regime under 
President Chadli Benjedid. Up until this point, the FLN’s power rested on a legitimacy 
which was founded in the idea that the political party had obtained Algeria its 
independence from the French. They relied on war-time stories and depended on the 
older generations to instill this respect in the younger populations of the nation. When 
this failed to transpire, the administration’s war-time rhetoric was no longer effective and 
therefore its legitimacy came into question. 
 To implement these sudden changes in infrastructure and society, Algeria took out 
billions of dollars worth of loans with high interest rates. The country’s economy was 
dependent upon oil and gas revenues, and fossil fuels represented nearly a third of the 
nation’s GDP at the end of the 1970s (Stora 2001, 186). The leaders of the government 
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depended upon the increasing revenues from this sector to repay their loans, a plan which 
backfired when oil prices tumbled in the 1980s. For a period of time oil revenues were 
large enough to allow “a boom in consumer goods” and a private sector emerged, as did a 
large gap between the rich and poor classes (Pierre 1995, 134). This gap led to further 
embitterment when the oil market plummeted. There was a lack of consumer goods and a 
scarcity in hard currency as a result. Citizens had to suffer shortages of cooking oil, 
coffee, and tea; “women waited in long lines for scare and expensive food while young 
men milled in frustration on street corners unable to find work” (Metz 1994, 62). The 
economic and socio-cultural crises were about to combine and create an explosive 
political crisis. 
 During this time of economic disaster, Islamists were able to increase their 
influence over a population who felt that their government had been unable to fulfill its 
economic promises. In the late 1970s, “Muslim activists engaged in isolated and 
relatively small-scale assertions of their will: harassing women whom they felt were 
dressed inappropriately, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and evicting 
official imams from their mosques” (Metz 1994, 62). The Islamists increased their 
activism and called for the dissolution of the National Charter and the formation of an 
Islamic government in 1982.  
Islam had always been a unifying force in Algeria and had played a role in the 
decisions of past leaders of the nation; Ben Bella banned the marketing of alcohol, 
Boumedienne chose Friday, the day of prayer, as the new weekend day, and Benjedid 
promoted the 1984 Family Code, which deprived women of the freedom to act on their 
own by making them wards of their family prior to marriage and accountable to their 
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husbands after marriage (Tahi 1995, 214). It was in the same year, 1984, that the 
government turned to religious leaders to “attest that its regime was essentially in 
conformity with Islam” and in return built one of the largest Islamic universities in the 
world amidst economic strife (Tahi, 1995, 214). The concessions that the government 
presented to the Islamists did not improve the status of its economy which was directly 
linked to the country’s social issues. Political Islam, “just like any other extremist 
ideology, nourishes itself essentially on poverty and hopelessness. Economic insecurity 
breeds fear, and fear breeds intolerance and violence in Algeria” (Tahi, 1995, 214). The 
single-party regime no longer held popular favor amongst its citizens and saw Islamists 
as a potential threat to its monopoly on power.  
Economic Reforms under Bendjedid 
 Algeria’s third President, Chadli Bendjedid, came into power in 1979 and adopted 
a guideline of distancing himself from the economic policies of his predecessor, Houari 
Boumedienne. Under his plan,  
basic industries were accused of monopolizing investment capital to the detriment 
of other sectors, running up external debt by their voracious cash demands, and 
operating bloated, bureaucratized enterprises at such low levels of productivity 
that they weighed down the whole economy. They had failed to create jobs in the 
numbers expected and those created were concentrated in three or four privileged 
northern towns while most of the country remained an economic backwater. The 
lack of attention to agriculture and consumer industry generated demand for 
imports that wasted foreign currency reserves and threatened the ability of the 
economy to capitalize growth in the future (Ruedy, 2005, 233).  
 
Inheriting a litany of public complaints, Bendjedid adopted the first five-year plan, which 
aimed at providing solutions to many of these problems. Under this plan, industry was 
given only 38.6% of the state’s total investment, which was used to complete pre-existing 
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projects. The agricultural sector received an increased 11.7% of investment, and there 
was also an increase in housing, healthcare, and other social infrastructure projects.  
 A second five-year plan was passed by the FLN Central Committee in May 1984 
with the recognition that “means of implementation were at least as important as goals 
themselves in achieving the better life” (Ruedy 2005, 233). The regime was trying to 
prepare its citizens for the continuation of the economic crisis that would occur before the 
improvements to the system would be felt by the general public. Citizens’ faith in the 
regime was wavering, and before the reforms had time to make an impact on the 
economy, the society began to react violently. In 1985, there was serious rioting in the 
Casbah and by 1986 the protests, organized primarily by young students, had spread 
across the country to Algiers, Oran, Skikda, Constantine, and Setif. The riots, strikes, and 
protests of 1987 were a “continuation of student unrest but also the beginning of labor 
unrest spreading rapidly from one sector to another” (Ruedy, 2005, 248). Eight years 
after the first Benjedid economic plan went into effect, wages remained stagnant, while 
prices soared and unemployment was at its highest rate in over a decade. There had not 
been an increase in new capital in the industrial sector as was hoped for, and popular 
perceptions of corruption within the government were furthering the feelings of 
resentment. 
 Protests and riots had been plaguing the nation during the month of September 
1988 and finally these events reached the city of Algiers on October 2, when postal 
employees went on strike. There were calls within the city for a general strike on October 
4, and although such a strike did not occur, “secondary school students did walk out and 
their movement spread rapidly amongst laborers and unemployed young people” (Ruedy 
 65
2005, 248). The next day the movement turned into a “popular revolt against a system 
legitimized by the ideals of November 1954” (Tahi 1995, 198). Thousands of young men 
stormed the center of the city, where they destroyed government and party property. Over 
the next two days the movement, which included student groups, unionists, and 
fundamentalists, spread to Oran, Blida, Annaba and many other towns throughout the 
nation.  
 The response of the FLN was quick and swift. Although the party did not outright 
blame the Islamists, it claimed that the “irresponsibles were manipulated by secret 
partners” (Stora 2001, 196). The President called in the military to restore order on 
October 6 and announced a state of siege (Mortimer 1996, 21). The military repression 
that would come to dominate the next decade had begun; the armed forces used clubs, 
tear gas, live ammunition, and several different kinds of automatic weapons to quell the 
masses. In the end, “before order was more or less restored on October 10, hundreds of 
Algerians-mostly young men- had died and thousands had been taken into custody where 
many were tortured” (Ruedy 2005, 248). This response left the country angered at the 
military as well as the single-party system and the repression did not halt opposition but 
rather encouraged its growth. Citizens from all classes began to call for the 
administration’s recognition of its role in the events in addition to a change of 
government.  
 President Benjedid responded to these calls for change and by the end of the 
month he had outlined a clear strategy for reform, which included making the 
government responsible to Parliament (Assemblée Populaire et Nationale- APN), 
summoning a party congress to consider other constitutional reforms, and asking for a 
 66
popular referendum on proposed reforms that would revise the 1976 Constitution (Ruedy 
2005, 249). There were three goals in the proposed referendum which the regime hoped 
would please the people: “separation of state and the FLN, freedom of candidacies in 
municipal and legislative elections and the independence of ‘mass organizations’” (Stora 
2001, 197). On November 3, Algerians approved the constitutional amendments with 
ninety-three percent of the vote and President Benjedid appointed Colonel Kasdi Merbah 
as the state’s new Prime Minister. That December the sixth regular party Congress met to 
discuss the next candidate for Presidency. Despite receiving strong criticism of the new 
changes that he tried to implement, which undercut the privileged position of the FLN, 
Benjedid received the nomination as the FLN candidate for Presidency for a third term 
and was elected on December 22 (Ruedy 2005, 249). After securing his power, Benjedid 
was able to bring his reforms directly to the people. In presenting these reforms, the 
President hoped to give the people enough political freedoms to temporarily placate 
them, which would in turn protect his administration. 
The Constitution of 1989 and the Upheaval of the Single-Party System 
 In February 1989 Algerian voters overwhelming approved the new Constitution, 
which had the goal of creating a more plural system in the country and provide the break 
with the past that the citizens so desired. This new Constitution guaranteed “the freedoms 
and basic rights of man and the citizen” including freedom of expression, association and 
meeting (Ruedy 2005, 250). With the previous political system in Algeria, the 
Presidency, the FLN party, and the army were the three main centers of power, yet the 
new Constitution only allowed the President to retain his influence. The new document 
no longer mentioned socialism or the FLN and Article 40 opened the nation to a multi-
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party system (Stora 2001, 198). The army was characterized as “a military institution for 
the defense of the unity and sovereignty of the nation” and in March the army officially 
withdrew its participation from all political bodies (Ruedy 2005, 250). There was an 
enormous amount of excitement surrounding these changes, yet the regime had not 
effectively prepared for the differences that would come with a more plural and 
democratic government. 
 After the approval of the new Constitution, there was a wealth of legislation from 
the APN designed to expedite the democratization process. It produced “a new law on 
political associations, a new electoral law, and a new public information act” in addition 
to abolishing the State Security Council, the main purpose of which was punish political 
deviation (Ruedy 2005, 251). It was also during this time that Prime Minister Merbah 
tried to reform business operations and restart the growth of the economy. Merbah’s 
economic policy encountered difficulties, including  
the challenge of learning the new methods of management, the absence of a stock 
exchange, the scarcity of means for making foreign debt payments, the lack of 
social consensus, the lack of an economic and democratic culture within civil 
society, and the blocking of reform by the deputies, all of whom belonged to the 
FLN (Stora 2001, 199).  
 
These problems in addition to the continuation of strikes, shortages, and inflation led 
President Benjedid to fire Merbah and replace him with Mouloud Hamrouche.  
 Citizens took advantage of the new pluralistic government and the weakness of 
the current regime by forming new parties to challenge the status-quo. Leaders of parties 
who had previously opposed the FLN returned from exile, including Hocine Ait Ahmed 
of the Front des Forces Socialists (FFS) and Ahmed Ben Bella, who returned to lead the 
Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie (MDA). It was not solely pre-established 
 68
parties that came to challenge the regime, however; in fact forty-four parties were formed 
within that first year. Human rights leagues, women’s rights organizations, and cultural 
movements all developed and “the democratization process was real, even though the 
FLN remained a dominant party” (Stora 2001, 199). Of the parties that emerged, thirty-
three were officially recognized, the majority of which were secular in nature. Of the 
three parties that were religious, it would be the Front Islamique du Salut that would 
come to be the largest threat to the FLN and its grip on power.  
The Formation of the FIS 
 The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was a coalition of Islamic groups whose 
leaders came together on February 18, 1989 to discuss their unification. Although it 
publicly announced its formation of an allied party on March 10, the group was 
composed of two main currents, the radical Salafis and the Djazarists (Ruedy 2005, 251). 
The members of the Islamic movement, including both the Salafis and the Djazarists, 
recruited not only the underprivileged but also the young elite in the mass education 
institutions who faced a lack of “job outlets that corresponded to their qualifications and 
met their aspirations, as well as a lack of access to any posts of responsibility” (Tahi 
1995, 215). The agenda of the Djazarists did not contain a revolutionary dimension and it 
believed in the “necessity of change, informing the population about the relevance of 
Islam to a modern life, and activism in spreading Islamic values and practices” (Ruedy, 
2005, 251). It felt that the taking of power legally through elections was the only way to 
truly have a stable Islamic state. The Salafists, on the other hand, felt the necessity to 
establish “an immediate Islamic state after the taking of power by arms” (Tahi, 1995, 
215). This section was an offshoot of reformist salafism and demanded rapid 
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transformation of the Algerian state and society (Ruedy 2005, 251). The majority of this 
sect was comprised of imams or preachers in districts that subscribed to the traditional 
Arabic language and Islamic education. Many of the Salafists were also former members 
of the Buyali band, a group that had taken up arms in the 1980s, or veterans of the war in 
Afghanistan (Mortimer 1996, 23). It would be the Salafists who would later form the 
Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), a military organization that would make it extremely 
difficult to hold negotiations between the regime and that FIS front.  
 The official authorization of the FIS marked the first time a Muslim and Arab 
nation sanctioned a political party that had Islam at its foundation, a fact that was made 
very clear with its official declaration. The group highlighted seven key objectives, some 
of which would be abandoned as the struggle for representation continued. The FIS was 
initially founded with the goals of “the preservation of the unity of the Muslim umma, the 
substitution of Islamic ideology for imported ideology, movement via a middle path, 
tactical moderation, collective action, encouraging the spirit of initiative, and the 
safeguarding of Islamic historical and cultural heritage” (Ruedy 2005, 252). The party 
was led by Abassi Madani, who served as President, and Ali Benhadj, the FIS’ Vice-
President. Many in the FLN party feared the potential of the FIS, knowing the important 
role that religion plays in Algerian society, but the President and Prime Minister believed 
that institutional guarantees were strong enough to defeat any threat.  
FIS Victories and the Military Coup 
 With the new formation of a multi-party system, the President announced that 
local and provincial elections would be held in June 1990. The electoral system was 
established in such a way that it would overwhelmingly favor the largest party, which 
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was presumed to be the FLN, and as a result many of the smaller, secular parties 
including the FFS decided to boycott these elections. In addition to unfair practices, these 
parties had little time to establish a grassroots foundation whereas the FIS, which had 
links to over 9,000 mosques, had an “instant and effective organization” (Ruedy 2005, 
253). On June 12, the FIS party won 54% of the popular vote, whereas the FLN garnered 
28%; these results translated to the FIS obtaining control of 800 out of 1500 municipal 
councils including Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba (Ruedy 2005, 253). At the 
time,  
the government thought that economic and social measures would allow it to limit 
the FIS’ influence. This was a misunderstanding of the significant grassroots work 
done by the Islamist militants; but above all, it was a poor judgment of what made 
the FIS strong: its conception of the nation as exclusively Muslim and rid of all 
foreign influence (Stora 2001, 203).  
 
To those who voted, a vote for the FIS party was seen as a vote in protest of the current 
regime, yet the outcome of this democratic election was not what the FLN or the military 
had hoped for.  
 Immediately the FIS began to implement and enforce its Islamist agenda which 
sometimes conflicted with constitutional requirements. Within its districts, the 
organization began closing schools that were co-educational, forbidding married women 
to work outside of the home, requiring all women to wear headscarves, and prohibiting 
all alcohol (Ruedy 2005, 253). The FIS strengthened its new-found authority with the 
start of the Gulf War. As an organization which opposed all foreign influence, it began to 
call on the FLN to assist its Islamic brethren and wanted to send volunteers to fight 
against Western forces. The FLN refused to further stretch its already limited resources 
and thousands of people marched on the streets in protest. Despite conflicting opinions 
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toward Saddam Hussein amongst the Algerian population, all parties condemned the 
actions of the West and once again provided the Islamists with leverage against the 
current regime.  
The FIS party began lobbying for parliamentary elections under the new multi-
party system to replace the 1987 APN. After “great controversy and internal splits, the 
regime decided to go ahead with parliamentary elections in December 1991 and foolishly 
adopted an electoral system similar to the French two-cycle, winner-take-all model” 
(Pierre 1995, 135). In an attempt to ensure a pro-FLN outcome of the elections, 
legislation was passed which promoted gerrymandering favoring the party, the 
implementation of a ban on campaigning at mosques and schools, and the repeal of the 
right of men to cast votes for their wives” (Ruedy 2005, 254). Islamists naturally opposed 
these measures and organized a strike, which the military interpreted as an assault on the 
state. While “the strike was not especially well organized or successful, demonstrations 
and the occupation of public places by FIS supporters” made the military fearful of a 
possible assault (Ruedy 2005, 254). The military believed that the policies of the 
Homrouche government were too permissive and after severe pressure from Major 
General Khaled Nezzar, the President declared a state of siege on June 4, which resulted 
in fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests (Ruedy 2004, 254). A new Prime Minister, Sid 
Ahmed Ghozali, was appointed and promised reform of the new electoral laws. Although 
this temporarily placated the FIS, the two leaders of the party were calling for an Islamic 
Republic and threatened the regime with a jihad by the end of the month. The army 
quickly moved in again and arrested Madani, Benhadj, and hundreds more. The FIS 
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Council quickly named Abdelkader Hachani as the temporary leader of the party and 
outbursts of violence continued in the months leading up to the election.  
The first round of the elections took place on December 26 and the government 
continued to assume that it could turn this winner-take-all system “to its own advantage, 
winning more seats than it would be entitled to through a popular vote” (Pierre 1995, 
135). The opposite actually occurred and even though the FIS received one million votes 
fewer than in the municipal elections, “the non-Islamist vote was so badly fragmented” 
that it became clear that the FIS would overwhelmingly win the second round of elections 
(Pierre 1995, 135). In this first round, the FIS received 47.54% of the vote, which 
translated to 188 out of 430 districts, whereas the FLN won 15 and the FFS won 26 
districts (Ruedy 2005, 255). The government and FLN claimed that the elections were 
invalid since there were massive voting irregularities and an abstention rate of 39%, but 
despite these serious concerns it appeared that the President was going to continue with 
the second round of elections (Ruedy 2005, 255). Despite his intentions to fulfill his 
promise for a more democratic and pluralistic government, Benjedid’s actions would not 
be accepted by the majority of the regime.  
Members of the government’s cabinet, including military officials, felt that the 
transfer of power to the FIS would be an utter disaster for a variety of reasons. Some in 
the regime were, “concerned about preserving the secular, nationalist traditions of the 
nation and others about maintaining its fragile transition to democracy. Still others were 
concerned about losing personal power and access to wealth” (Ruedy 2005, 255). The 
military leaders had come to a common decision and informed President Benjedid that he 
was to step down as the leader of Algeria. He resigned on January 11, 1992, after 
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dissolving the Parliament; this created the difficult question of leadership since the 
replacement, according to the constitution, is the Speaker of the APN. The military 
leaders of the coup decided that power would be passed to the only constitutional body of 
power left, which was a Presidential advisory committee, known as the Haut Comite de 
Sécurité (HCS). The HCS was a “hastily convened body made up of Ghozali, the Prime 
Minister, along with Benhabiles, President of the Supreme Court, Benkhelil, the Justice 
Minister, Brahimi, the Foreign Affairs Minister, and three senior military officials: 
Nezzar, the Defense Minister, Belkheir, the Interior Minister, and Guenaizia, the Chief of 
Staff” (Evans 2007, 171). The HCS declared that the December election was annulled 
and that the second round of legislative elections would not go on as planned. To fill the 
vacuum of power that now existed, the organization created the Haut Comite d’État 
(HCE), a five-person political body that would serve as a collective presidency until 
elections could be held at the end of 1993. This new organization now created a severely 
unstable political situation in Algeria, where the regime in power was lacking legitimacy 
while another party was willing to use violent actions to obtain power. 
The High State Council and the Descent into War 
 The HCE was immediately rejected by the major political parties in Algeria, 
including the certain members of the FLN, who believed that “nobody was entitled to 
stop the electoral process” (Tahi 1995, 200). Nearly a quarter of the population had voted 
for the FIS during the election and naturally they felt that “they had played by the rules 
and passionately believed that the second round should have proceeded” (Ruedy 2005, 
258). It was at this time that the Salafists came into ascension, as it had proved that the 
Djazarists’ theory of political action held little clout in overthrowing the current regime.  
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 In the beginning of 1992, Algeria was a deeply divided country in need of a leader 
who could rejuvenate and reconcile. This individual came in the form of Mohamed 
Boudiaf, a hero from the Revolution who had been in exile in Morocco for many years. 
He initially delivered harsh criticisms against both the regime and the FIS party and 
believed that he could, “steer the country between the dual shoals of the old FLN order 
and the new Islamism while averting a complete takeover by the army” (Mortimer 1996, 
26). Boudiaf returned to Algeria and became the acting President of the High State 
Council. The other four members of the HCE were Major General Khaled Nezzar, 
Colonel Ali Kafi, Tidjani Haddam, a former minister of religious affairs, and Ali Haroun, 
who had been the head of the Office National des Anciens Moudjahidine. Within the 
HCE the impact of the army was felt and it adopted a goal of completely repressing the 
FIS before the new elections in 1993.  
 The division between Djazarists and Salafis became increasingly pronounced as 
the Algerian regime relied more on violence as a means of suppressing the opposition. 
The Djazarists had yet to form a military branch to counter the actions of the Salafis. The 
group had evolved “from an informal, mostly francophone group of Algiers University 
faculty and students and had developed in the intellectual path laid out by Malek 
Bennabi, a French-educated professor” (Ruedy 2005, 251). The Djazarists party came to 
power within the FIS organization after the consultative council “named Abdelkader 
Hachani, a representative of the moderate djazarist wing, as interim head of the party” in 
the middle of 1991 (Ruedy 2005, 254). Under his leadership, street activism markedly 
declined and the anti-violence message of the Djazarists was promoted. Even after the 
establishment of the HCE, Hachani and other FIS leaders called “upon demonstrators to 
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avoid violence and sought cooperation with other parties- such as the FFS and the FLN” 
(Ruedy 2005, 259). The policy that the Algerian administration adopted in the beginning 
of 1992 made it increasingly difficult for FIS supporters to embrace the ideology of the 
Djazarists.  
 Despite the change in leadership within the FIS, the Salafis, which was primarily 
comprised of imams or preachers in popular districts with traditional Arabic language and 
Islamic education, was validated in its quest for jihad with the cancellation of the 1992 
elections. It was also during this time that the organization began to separate into smaller 
armed groups. The main one from 1991 until 1993 was the Mouvement Islamique Armé 
(MIA), which was reconstituted with the “belief in the efficacy and importance of armed 
struggle” (Willis 1997, 269). Although the group preferred not to attack the regime 
directly, it began to launch individual operations against the security forces after the 
establishment of the HCE in 1992 (Willis 1997, 269). By the summer of that year the 
MIA had become had become the main source of organized armed resistance within the 
party. Despite the effectiveness of the MIA, it was not the only armed group to exist 
during this time; “Personal ambition and ideological differences played a significant part 
in the formation of the dissident groupings” (Willis 1997, 280). The MIA was a 
forerunner for the Groupement Islamique Armé (GIA), which was based on the ideology 
that “We reject the religion of democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is equal to 
sedition. It has never been our intention to participate in elections or enter parliament. 
The right to legislate belongs solely to God” (Willis 1997, 282). Although the leader of 
the GIA, Mansour Meliani, was arrested by security forces in the middle of June 1992, 
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the organization would regroup in 1993 and become one of the most violent factions 
within the FIS.  
 Although the Djazarists continued to call for an avoidance of violence, the army 
began to arrest suspected members of the party the day after it was announced that the 
second round of elections were cancelled. News of “the arrests and violent measures 
taken by police brought dramatic increases in the number and size of protests, which 
ranged from street marches to blockades of public buildings, student strikes, and massive 
demonstrations outside mosques after Friday prayers” (Ruedy 2005, 259). Party leaders, 
including Djazarist leader Hachani, were arrested for encouraging revolts against the 
army and the government began to severely limit the press coverage that the FIS actions 
were getting. Despite these measures, the protests continued and on February 9, 1992,  
the High State Council declared a state of siege, which “empowered the Interior Minister 
to take all actions necessary to maintain law and order” (Ruedy 2005, 259). The next day, 
for the first time since its formation, the Islamists publicly declared responsibility for the 
deaths of eight police officers; with these mass arrests it was no longer possible for the 
Djazarists to provide a balance to the Salafis’ argument. By early February it was 
estimated that between fifty and a hundred and fifty people had been killed and between 
two hundred and seven hundred had been wounded in the protests; several thousand had 
been arrested and sent to internment camps (Ruedy 2005, 259). The goal of dismantling 
the FIS was growing with urgency as the political crisis continued. 
 On March 4 of the same year, the Algiers Judicial Council officially dissolved the 
FIS political party and by the end of the month the government had disbanded nearly half 
of the councils that the FIS had won in the municipal elections. These actions of the 
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government did not destroy the Islamist movement but simply forced it underground. 
During this time, Boudiaf “strove to avert the slide into violence by promising a radical 
change of the old order and criticizing the corruption which had characterized the 
Benjedid years” (Mortimer 1996, 27). He did not support the principles of the Islamist 
parties but understood that acts of compromise, such as the closing of some of the 
internment camps, were necessary to avoid a catastrophic conflict. His opposition to the 
FLN made him a threat to those in power and his willingness to negotiate made him a 
target for organizations like the Armed Islamic Group, which believed that compromise 
would not result in an Islamic Republic. Boudiaf was assassinated on June 29 although it 
was never determined if it was the act of the Islamists or the government itself. 
 On July 3, Ali Kafi became the new President of the High State Council and 
inherited a further deteriorating political and security situation as well as a fragile 
economy. The murder of Boudiaf “hastened the polarization into two camps: the military 
and the Islamist movement, which gradually fell under the sway of its most violent 
elements” (Mortimer 1996, 27). At first, Islamist violence, led by the MIA, was directed 
at soldiers, police, and their facilities, yet on August 26 the rules of the conflict changed 
when a bomb exploded in the international terminal at the Algiers airport. This marked 
one of the first random acts of violence against citizens and as a result ten people were 
killed and at least one hundred were injured (Ruedy 2005, 261). By November, the 
estimates of the number of deaths ranged from three thousand to six thousand people and 
it was at this time that the government imposed a curfew in the major cities that served as 
hotbeds for FIS activity in Algeria. 
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 Just as there was a division within the FIS organization over the use of violence, 
there was a division within the current regime between the Eradicators and the 
Conciliators. The Eradicators were composed of members from the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy, a liberal, secular political party, the Parti de L’Avant Garde Socialiste, a 
communist organization that was the second most powerful party in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the Sécurité Militaire, all of whom banned together to refuse a referendum and 
demand the annihilation of the FIS. The Conciliators were comprised of members of the 
FFS, FLN, MDA, and HAMAS, a moderate Islamist party, and demanded “a gesture of 
receptivity from the authorities and the inclusion of the ex-FIS in the dialogue” (Tahi 
1995, 205). These divisions would continue to plague Algeria and make it extremely 
difficult for any form of popular resolution to be produced.  
 A year after the resignation of President Benjedid, the cancellation of the 
elections, and the establishment of the High State Council, Islamist organizations more 
than doubled its attacks, which now included non-combatant individuals. General Nezzar 
narrowly escaped an assassination attempt with a car bomb in February 1993. The Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) began to reform as a coalition of urban terrorist groups, which were 
responsible for the first assassinations of “civilian intellectuals” beginning in March 1993 
(Mortimer 1996, 28). Former Prime Minister Qasdi Mirbah published an open letter 
calling for the FIS to enter into negotiations with other political parties, namely those of 
the Conciliators, as a means of forming a government of national union. Since he was 
referring to negotiations and a mutual compromise as a means of ending the violence, he 
posed a threat to the ideology of the GIA and was murdered by the organization in 
August (Mortimer, 1996, 32). In October, three French consular officers were kidnapped 
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and released with a note demanding that all foreigners leave the country by the end of the 
month; beginning in November, these Islamist armed forces began to specifically target 
all foreigners who refused to heed this warning (Ruedy 2005, 261). In the end the GIA 
killed thirty-four foreigners between September 1992 and March 1993 (Roberts 2003, 
154). This naturally concerned many Western nations, specifically France, which began 
to send weapons and financial aid to the Algerian military as the attacks on its citizens by 
the GIA increased.  
 As 1993 came to a close, the mandate for the High State Council was set to expire 
and a new President was to be elected. The National Dialogue Commission was formed 
in September 1993 with the “specific task of achieving a consensus with the opposition 
parties on the nature of the new governing body that the HCE had pledged itself to cede 
power to when its own two year ‘mandate’ expired at the end of the year” (Willis 1997, 
311). It was hoped that the Commission would result in a reconciliation conference 
attended by all of the political parties, but since the Conciliators refused to participate 
without the FIS, the talks were futile. Recognizing that the nation was no more stable 
now than it was two years ago, the High Security Council appointed Defense Minister 
Liamine Zeroual as President for a three year term and dissolved the HCE.  
The Insurgency in the Civil War 
 After 1993, the amount of violence within the nation intensified and it was 
estimated that the attacks and murders attributed to both the Islamist groups and the 
actions of reprisal by the Algerian forces resulted in 30,000 deaths by the end of 1994; 
after May of that year between forty-five and sixty people were killed everyday (Stora 
2001, 215). Islamist armed groups became the most effective methods of promoting the 
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ideology of the FIS religious movement as it increased its violence over the next two 
years. Even before the political crisis that befell Algeria in 1992, there were Islamic 
groups which believed that jihad was the only way to obtain an Islamic state, including 
the Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), which would later battle the GIA for control 
over the Islamist movement. After 1992, the GIA would become the most successful, 
radical, and violent wing of the movement and was developed by numerous insurgency 
cells which banded together. Its official slogan was “No dialogue, No truce, No 
reconciliation” and it condemned all non-believers in jihad, even if they were active 
members of the FIS party (Ruedy 2005, 263). Under Ahmed Ben Aicha, the Armée 
Islamique du Salut (AIS) was formed in May 1994. By this time the FIS had considered 
negotiating with the Algerian government and therefore was labeled as a traitor by the 
GIA; therefore the AIS was in direct opposition the armed movement of the GIA (Ruedy 
2005, 264). AIS attracted many FIS loyalists as well as some fighters from the MIA and a 
considerable number of army deserters. It proclaimed itself the “armed wing of the FIS”, 
and although it did maintain that jihad was a way of establishing an Islamic state, it did 
not feel that this policy was imperative; it also condemned the specific targeting of 
civilians. 
 Despite the formation of the AIS as a means of balancing the actions of the GIA, 
the latter increased their terrorist attacks on civilians. On the rebellion’s side there was a 
mass attack “by 150-200 armed men on the prison of Tazoult, near Batna, in which some 
900 prisoners (1,684 according to a FIS statement) were freed, mostly FIS militants and 
condemned Islamist terrorists” (Roberts 2003, 152). The armed Islamist group also 
murdered the Director of Communications in the office of the Prime Minister and one 
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week later killed a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; these two attacks 
meant that “the terror was now unprecedentedly close to front-rank political office-
holders” (Roberts 2003, 152). It was also during this time that the GIA announced that 
“anyone who attended a regime school, followed a lifestyle contrary to Islamic teaching, 
or failed to support jihad was a target” and as a result they began setting off bombs in 
restaurants, post offices, markets, cinemas, and other public places (Ruedy 205, 264). It 
adopted the policy of compliance terrorism, or terrorism directed at Muslims to obtain 
compliance, as well as organizational terrorism, which had the goal of strengthening the 
organization. These are the same policies that the FLN had successfully used in the 1950s 
to defeat the French. On October 6, 1994 the Minister of Education announced that over 
six hundred schools had been burned or destroyed and fifty civilian teachers had been 
killed (Stora 2001, 216). Communes and villages were forced to pay large fees to 
members of the GIA and those who did not would suffer large scale massacres. It was 
through threats and massive acts of violence that the GIA obtained the support, or at the 
very least compliance, of the general public. 
 It was not solely the policy of the Islamists that caused massive casualties. 
Civilians also suffered under the tactics of the Algerian police and military forces. These 
tactics included the “indiscriminate targeting of young males in communes supportive of 
the FIS as well as arrests, torture aimed at extracting information and summary 
executions” (Ruedy 2005, 265). There is also evidence that soldiers acted out terrorist 
acts dressed as insurgents as a way to increase support for their goal, which was to 
maintain the power of the current regime. By dressing in disguise, the military would be 
promoting the image that the violent acts of the Islamists discredited their claim to power. 
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It was also reported that attacks on civilians near military posts would generate no 
response from the forces itself, which chose only to help those that it knew were never 
pro-FIS.  
Elections and Constitutions of 1996 
 President Zeroual had previously associated himself with the Conciliators and 
believed that military means alone would not restore civil order. Although he and his 
government carried on dialogue with the leaders of FIS, “Zeroual was limited in the 
actual concessions he could grant” because the military members of the cabinet refused to 
give into demands, such as the release of FIS leaders from prison (Ruedy 2005, 265). At 
the same time, the rivalry between the GIA and the MIA “caused them to up the ante and 
to engage in a race to expand from their initial bases into new territory, and this situation 
in turn made it impossible for the FIS to respond unequivocally to Zeroual’s gestures in 
its direction” (Roberts 2003, 155). The military insisted that the first concession come 
from the FIS yet the political leaders of the opposing camp could “ill afford to give an 
order that the armed insurgents would ignore”; both sides were limited by extremists 
(Mortimer 1996, 34). Zeroual once again attempted to initiate negotiations in the summer 
of 1994, when he reopened talks with the two main leaders of the FIS, who were 
imprisoned in Blida. This “elicited two letters from them in which, alongside a number of 
demands, the FIS pledged to ‘respect political pluralism and alternation in power via 
elections’” (Mortimer 1996, 34). The President took this as a sign of good faith and 
released Madani and Benhadj to house arrest in Algiers, where they would have 
unrestricted communications. The forces of the GIA released a statement reiterating its 
refusal to negotiate with the government while anti-Islamists criticized the government 
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for a “unilateral concession” (Mortimer 1996, 34). As the fortieth anniversary of the start 
of the War for Independence approached, negotiations came to a halt as neither party 
could fulfill the preconditions of the other. 
Encouraged by the willingness of the President to consider dialogue with the 
opposition, and his announcement in November that Presidential elections would be held 
in Algeria before the end of 1995, several of the major political parties, including the FIS, 
FLN, FFS, and MDA, met with the Saint Egidio Catholic community in Rome to once 
again initiate negotiations -- this time without the restrictions and preconditions of the 
Algerian administration. It is important to note that by this time the GIA was a “headless 
monster, inflicting senseless murder and violence on all sides” (Evans 2007, 222). Just as 
the GIA was separate from the FIS, so to was the FLN separate from the Algerian regime, 
which was now overtaken by the military. The talks in November led to four basic 
principles: “the rejection of violence, support for democracy, open competitive elections, 
and respect for human rights” (Mortimer 1996, 35). Despite the condemnation of the 
Algerian government, the parties met again and on January 13, 1995 signed the Platform 
for a National Contract, a document which represented a wide variety of political 
opinions that existed in Algeria. The Platform called for the convening of a national 
conference to create a transitional authority that would oversee free and pluralistic 
elections under the rules of the 1989 Constitution. It also outlined “the basic values and 
principles underlying its program and the system it wished to implement. These included 
the affirmation of human rights, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the separation 
of powers” (Ruedy 2005, 267). The document also assured the freedom of religion to all, 
while acknowledging that Islam has played an important role in shaping Algeria’s 
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identity. The Rome Platform “demonstrated what most people already knew, that the 
political parties were not the source of the impasse… and that they were not so deeply 
divided by ideological differences as to be unable to agree on the basic principles 
necessary to the foundation of the system of constitutional party-political competition” 
(Roberts 2003, 172). Despite the positive measures that these parties tried to take, the 
efforts were rejected by the government out of fear that it would force the military to 
admit to its atrocities. 
Around the same time of the Platform of Rome, the President installed a special 
commission to help prepare for the Presidential elections on November 16, 1995. The FIS 
was still unable to participate in the elections, therefore the major parties that had talked 
in Rome refused to take part in the voting. Only four candidates were able to collect the 
75,000 signatures necessary; besides Zeroual, the entrants were Said Saadi, of the 
secularist RCD party, Mahfoud Nahnah, the head of moderate Islamist HAMAS, and 
Nouredine Boukhrouh, the leader for the liberal Islamic movement PRA. The 
environment leading up to the elections was extremely tense and the GIA circulated death 
threats to those who voted; despite this fact, the turnout was nearly seventy-five percent 
and the elections were basically free and fair (Ruedy 2005, 267). In the end Zéroual won 
another term in office with nearly sixty-one percent of the vote.  
Despite an increase in violence that occurred in January 1996, the re-elected 
President announced that the government would hold parliamentary elections the 
following year, pending the draft of a new constitution. Algeria’s fourth constitution 
made numerous changes, the most important being the reinforcement of the executive 
branch. The new constitution “gave Algeria a bicameral legislature for the first time 
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where the lower house, the APN, was to be chosen by popular vote every five years, and 
the members of the upper house, the Council of the Nation, were selected two-thirds by 
communal and wilaya councils and the remaining third by the President” (Ruedy 2005, 
268). It also limited the President’s tenure to two five-year terms and although it 
promoted the creation of political parties it stated that “no political party could be 
founded on a ‘religious, linguistic, racial, sex, corporatist, or regional basis’” (Ruedy, 
2005, 268). With this new constitution, the President and government tried to ensure that 
there would not be a repeat of the 1991 catastrophe.  
Despite the fact that 1997 was the bloodiest year to date, the parliamentary 
elections were held, a massive step in overcoming the single-party system of the 1980s 
and the military regime of the 1990s. On June 5, 1997 the Rassemblement Nationale 
Démocratique, a new party formed by regime supporters including the Prime Minister, 
received the largest number of votes, totaling thirty-two percent or a hundred and fifty-six 
out of three hundred and eighty seats (Ruedy 2005, 268). The Mouvement pour la Societe 
et de la Paix, formally known as HAMAS, garnered sixty-nine seats and the FLN won 
sixty-two seats (Ruedy 2005, 268). Nearly all parties protested the results, making such 
claims as a lack of equal access to electronic media or that ballot boxes were destroyed. 
Despite the overwhelmingly bitter tone towards these elections, it is important to note 
that all the parties who met at the Platform of Rome did actively participate. 
The Continuation of Violence and the Presidential Elections 
 In the months immediately following the elections there was once again a massive 
outbreak of violence. Members of the GIA and other Islamist forces conducted massacres 
in several major cities to the south and east of Algiers, an area that had popularly 
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supported the FIS in the 1991 elections. One massacre was in the town of Bentalha, ten 
miles south of the capital. On September 22, 1997 over four hundred people, regardless 
of their sex or age, “were pitilessly slaughtered” (Roberts 2003, 309). According to 
witness accounts, “authorities refused requests from Bentalha’s residents for arms with 
which to defend themselves, security forces were stationed on the edge of the city, 
knowing what was taking place, troops manning the roadblock into the city stopped 
citizens from nearby villages from coming to the rescue, and the assailants were allowed 
to freely leave the city once they were finished” (Roberts 2003, 309). There were once 
again claims that the assailants were not Islamists but actually members of the army who 
were part of a special commando unit. This has never been formally proven although it 
would correspond with previous claims against the military, as well as its philosophy to 
perform any action that could discredit the Islamists. These violent acts continued into 
1998 as the international community began to investigate the Algerian problem in forums 
such as the United Nations. As the President’s record came under question, he announced 
on September 11, 1998 that there would be presidential elections in February 1999.  
 In response to the announcement, forty-eight individuals announced their 
candidacies, yet in the end only seven were able to be confirmed by the Constitutional 
Council. The seven candidates were comprised of  
“former Prime Ministers Moloud Hamrouche and Mokdad Sifi, Hocine Ait 
Ahmed of the FFS, Youssef Khateb, who had chaired the abortive national 
dialogue in 1994-95, moderate Islamists Abdallah Djaballah and Ahmed Taleb al 
Ibrahimi, and former Foreign Minister Abdelazi Bouteflika”, 
 
all of whom were powerful civilians (Ruedy 2005, 275). Bouteflika was the clear favorite 
of the military and although they never supported him outright, he did have more funds to 
spend on campaigning, as well as the support of the four most important parties in 
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Parliament. The six opposition candidates claimed that there were irregularities in the 
voting system and demanded to meet with the President prior to the election; he declined 
to meet with them and in response “they decided upon collective withdrawal from the 
elections and the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the results of the polls” (Ruedy 
2005, 275). These drastic changes to the election process, less than twenty-four hours 
before voting booths opened in Algeria, convinced nearly forty percent of the population 
not to participate in the election. In the end, President Bouteflika was inaugurated on 
April 27, 1999.  
 Bouteflika first chose to launch efforts for national reconciliation and quickly 
gained the support of the major leaders of the FIS party, including Abassi Madani. On 
July 13 he issued the Law of Civil Concord, which stated that it was providing the 
government with, “special measures to relieve from standard penalties, persons involved 
in, or who have been involved in, acts of terrorism or subversion who express in good 
faith their wish to cease their criminal activities, and to grant them the opportunity to put 
in concrete form this wish through re-entry into society” (Ruedy 2005, 276). Through this 
document, the individuals of the Islamist movement, specifically the AIS, were to come 
forward to the authorities, who then would grant amnesty to the fighters. The referendum 
for the Law of Civil Concord was held on September 16, 1999 and passed with 98.6% of 
the popular vote; by January 13, 2000, the final date for compliance, roughly 5,500 
militants had turned themselves over to the authorities (Ruedy 2005, 277). The Law of 
Civil Concord confirmed the strong desire across political barriers for the end of violence 
and upheaval throughout Algeria. 
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An Undefined End to a Civil War 
 While some members of the GIA did turn themselves in by the designated date, 
many resented the blanket amnesty granted to the AIS fighters and were fearful of the 
punishment they would receive should they surrender. Consequently, hundreds of guerilla 
forces from the GIA continued to fight and formed a coalition with another organization 
known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (Ruedy 2005, 277). The 
Law of the Civil Concord was not only disliked by the members of the GIA, but it was 
also disliked by the military. The army “launched major offensives against the guerrillas 
immediately after January 13 and the result was that the number of violent incidents 
actually increased during 2000 and that the number of deaths, rising to about 5,000, was 
roughly double that of 1999” (Ruedy 2005, 277). Yet after that year, the number of 
violent outbursts has continued to decline and in 2004, Nabil Sahraoui, the emir of the 
GSPC, was killed after his group had ambushed a military unit.  
 The Algerian Civil War has brought about a variety of results, some positive 
while others extremely negative. The political system is certainly more pluralistic and 
democratic than it was in the late 1980s and the country underwent yet another 
Presidential election in 2004, when President Bouteflika was re-elected for a second term. 
Yet, the road to experiencing this political state led to the division of a nation, one that is 
still under a state of emergency, fifteen years later (US Department of State). The actions 
of the military and Islamist guerilla groups have cost an estimated 150,000 lives with 
many more wounded or imprisoned. It will take many years for the state to become fully 
reconciled and prevail over the destruction of this conflict. 
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Conclusion: From Victims to Victimizers 
After analyzing the two main conflicts that affected Algeria in the twentieth 
century, despite noting some differences, one can draw a large number of parallels 
leading to the conclusion that the actions of the French in the War for Independence were 
strikingly similar to those of the Algerian administration in the 1990s. In addition, it can 
be claimed that the actions of the FLN in the 1950s greatly influenced the FIS policy of 
the 1990s. Finally, it could also be hypothesized that had the French pulled out of Algeria 
after the first year of the “Phony War”, the course of Algerian politics would have been 
altered significantly towards a more peaceful outcome. It is not solely the actors in the 
conflicts that remained similar, but tactics and events as well as political actions and 
propaganda transcended the thirty years between the conflicts. The role of the FLN and 
the French government are clearly defined during the War for Independence, one 
organization was fighting for political liberation while the other was trying to maintain 
colonial holdings. These roles are not as clearly defined during the Civil War and yet the 
argument could be made that the FLN administration had become the enemy, much like 
the French, while the Islamist organization of the FIS was viewed as a source of freedom, 
similar to the FLN in the 1950s. The victims of the War for Independence now became 
the victimizers, with a new organization garnering sympathy for their cause. 
There are differences that exist between the War for Independence and the 
Algerian Civil War. Firstly, the War for Independence had a clearly defined, external 
enemy and a common goal that would benefit almost all Muslim Algerians. This made it 
somewhat easier for the FLN to garner support at the time; even moderate political 
parties joined the battle for self-determination after France reacted so violently to the 
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threat against its power. Neither the FLN nor the FIS were able to experience this type of 
universal support during the Algerian Civil War. Because it was an internal conflict, it 
was difficult to define which organization was the enemy and therefore the support of the 
Algerian population was extremely divided.  
There were some differences between the Algerian and the French administration 
and the way both handled its military. Although both gave unbridled control to its armed 
forces during the war, as discussed below, the French government was able to still 
maintain control over the military. There were individuals in the French military who 
disagreed with the policies of Charles de Gaulle and they tried to overthrow the 
government with Barricade’s Week, the Generals’ Putsch, and the formation of the OAS. 
Although these individuals certainly tried to override the policies of the French 
government, they were unable to garner enough support or power to do so. The 
administration was able to quickly quell any attempts of a coup. This was not the case 
with the Algerian administration. The military had an extremely powerful role in the 
Algerian government, even prior to the crisis in 1991. It was the military which pressured 
the President to declare a state of siege in 1991, it was military leaders who informed 
President Benjedid that he was to resign, and it is suspected that it was the military which 
assassinated Boudiaf. The military successfully enacted a coup in 1992 and became the 
puppet master of the Algerian government. The French government had a much more 
distinct separation between its administration and its military, which allowed it to more 
easily form and implement policy as well as enter into negotiations with the FLN in 1962. 
It was the tangled relationship of the Algerian government and military which contributed 
to such a long internal conflict. 
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In addition to the differences in enemies and political goals, there were 
dissimilarities between the make-up of the actors and their actions. The FLN of the 1950s 
and the FIS of the 1990s differed in its armed factions. The FLN rallied with the ALN, 
and the two organizations worked together to support a common goal through common 
means. Both organizations believed in Algerian self-determination and its tactics and 
methods of achieving that goal evolved together. Both used scare tactics, such as the 
mutilations of French loyalists, to coerce Algerian citizens to provide food and funds. 
The FLN and the ALN together, adopted a policy of collective reprisals and terrorism, 
which would include acts against citizens. Although FLN battled with the MNA, that was 
a separate political party with a separate ideology. This unity was not shared by the FIS 
in the 1990s. The organization itself had two very distinct ideologies; the Salafis believed 
that jihad was necessary to establish an Islamic political state, whereas the Djazarists 
believed in the taking of power legally through elections. This division alone caused 
distinct policy problems and made it difficult for the leaders of the FIS to have control 
over their party, as shown by Hachani, the temporary leader of the FIS who was 
undermined by the armed groups in 1991 and 1992. There were also many different 
armed organizations under the common umbrella of the FIS. The GIA differed from the 
MIA as well as the AIS and these political factions all battled each other based upon the 
understanding that its individual political ideology was the best method possible to obtain 
an Islamic state. The GIA refused to negotiate with the Algerian administration, whereas 
the FIS and the AIS wanted to enter into peace talks. This internal split within the FIS 
weakened the party greatly and although it implemented many of the same policies of the 
FLN in the 1950s, the divisions prevented it from being successful.  
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 Despite the aforementioned differences, the revolutionary organizations of the 
FLN in the 1950s and the FIS in the 1990s are extremely comparable in both ideology 
and makeup. The FLN was comprised of a small group of young men who were in their 
twenties and from middle-class backgrounds. The organization was based on a policy of 
collective leadership, which worked to its advantage since it became difficult for the 
French to completely dismantle it. Its doctrine strongly exemplified Islamic influences 
and it turned to the Islamic ulama to garner support amongst the citizens and other 
political parties. There were splits within the cause itself, as demonstrated by the constant 
battle with the Mouvement National Algérien, but the party was generally united. The 
FLN was unwilling to accept anything less than total independence, a quality of 
stubbornness that that the FIS, and more specifically the GIA, would later adopt.  
The FIS was also an organization that was founded on a coalition of Islamic 
groups, and much like the FLN, was deeply divided in its cause between two main 
currents, the Salafis and the Djazarists. The main body of the organization was found in 
the young generations of Algerians, who were once again displeased with the 
performance of their government. These men were unemployed and well-educated, with 
no ties to the FLN or the War for Independence. There were more moderate factions of 
the group, like the AIS, which believed that negotiations were possible, yet there were 
also those, like the members of the GIA, who believed that negotiations were a sign of 
defeat by the Algerian administration. Much like the FLN in the 1950s, the more 
extremist factions of the FIS attacked the moderate groups, not wanting a different 
viewpoint to gain popularity. With so many similarities, the FLN administration should 
have been able to look at the FIS and understand what type of reaction was needed to 
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quell such a group and yet it was unable to do so because it had changed so much since it 
first took power. 
The Changing Role of the FLN in Free Algeria 
Besides the parallels in the insurgency organizations of both conflicts, there were 
numerous similarities in the policies of the governments prior to the War for 
Independence and the Civil War. Before the outbreak of total violence at Philippeville in 
1955, France tried to offer a number of reforms, with the hopes of placating the FLN. It 
promised the initiation of major public works projects as well as an increase in salary and 
the improvement of the Algerian education system. Although these proposals were never 
carried out because the Algerian government was disbanded, the efforts of the French 
administration were nearly identical to those that the Algerian administration proposed in 
the 1980s leading up to the crisis. Algerian President, Chadli Bendjedid, created two five-
year plans, in 1979 and 1984; both tried to address issues such as high unemployment 
rates and the monopolization of investment capital by basic industries. The President was 
unable to make affective changes and soon the citizens of Algeria began to strike. The 
leadership in Algeria, whether French or Algerian, was unable to properly address the 
major problems that faced the country and this atmosphere of discontent led to the 
promotion of civil uprising and Islamic ideology. 
The reactions of the Algerian administration towards a threat to its power seemed 
strongly influenced by those of its colonial predecessors. Although the French did not 
initially view the FLN as a serious threat, it did respond to the action of the organization 
with mass punishments. An example of collective reprisals by the French can be found in 
its response to the Philippeville Massacre, where over twelve thousand people were killed 
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or went missing. The FLN, which at the time used these mass punishments as a further 
justification for extreme and violent reactions against the French, came to adopt a policy 
of torture and extreme violence with its newfound power. It indiscriminately targeted 
young males in areas known to support the FIS, conducted massive arrests, and 
performed summary executions. Torture became the administration’s favorite technique 
to extract information, much like a French policy that was highly controversial for many 
years after the end of the War for Independence.  
Another common reaction by both the Algerian administration and the French 
administration that seemed to shape the way in which the conflict unfolded, was the role 
that each gave to the military. When it became clear that the FLN was a very serious 
threat to the French colonial power, and that the organization had the ability to perform 
effective political and military actions, the French government ceded its political 
authority to the military leadership in Algeria. This naturally undercut any possibility for 
a political negotiation. The Battle of Algiers, where the paratroopers were given carte-
blanche, was another example of the atrocities that occurred when the military was given 
unrestricted power. There was so much violence in that city that it became difficult to 
differentiate between provocation terrorism and vengeance terrorism and although the 
military was successful in removing the FLN from the city, its actions persuaded more 
individuals to support the cause of Algerian liberation. The unobstructed power of the 
military would once again come to haunt Algerian politics, when the military forced 
President Bendjedid to resign in 1992, and set in place a system where military personnel 
became leaders in the new government. With an indirect, yet increasing, control over the 
government, the military adopted an ever more violent policy, which in turn led to a 
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growing number of protests from citizens. Even at the end of the conflict, after the Law 
of Civil Concord had been passed, the army launched major offensives against the 
guerillas, doubling the number of deaths for the year. The leadership of free Algeria made 
the same policy mistakes as its colonial precursor and its aggressive and brutal actions led 
to an increase of support for the FIS, rather than showing the people that an Islamic 
government would fail to provide the changes needed for national success. 
There are also many examples which could be used to support the claim that the 
FIS of the 1990s took many of its policies, strategies, and tactics from the FLN of the 
1950s; this only adds further irony to the situation since the FLN administration of the 
1990s claimed its legitimacy from its actions in the war against France and yet it believed 
that the events planned by the FIS invalidated the Islamic party. Both groups relied 
heavily on scare tactics and threats of terrorism to receive the support of the Algerian 
citizens. The FLN would extort food and funds from the civilians and threaten them with 
violence if they refused to cooperate and maintain their silence. The FIS destroyed 
hundreds of schools across the country with fires and communes and villages were forced 
to pay large fees to members of the Islamic militant groups of the FIS; those communities 
which refused would suffer large scale massacres. Acts of terrorism by the insurgents 
were also popular tactics during both wars and proved to be fairly effective tools of 
provocation. The FLN would place bombs at popular meeting places or other locations 
that would garner a great deal of attention from the French. Its hope was that the events 
could provoke the French to react with an unequal, greater response, further angering and 
instilling fear in the people of Algeria; numerous examples were previously discussed in 
the prior chapter. The FLN administration was forced to deal with the same policy over 
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thirty years later, when the FIS began to set off bombs in restaurants, post offices, 
markets, cinemas, and other public places. The FIS once again fostered a sense of 
hopelessness and terror amongst Algerians and the government was forced to react with 
collective punishments, further angering the citizens and directing their support towards 
the insurgency. 
A Hypothetical, Peaceful Algeria 
 When one looks back on the history of Algeria, it can be noted that there are a 
number of events, which having received a different outcome, would have completely 
altered the North African country. One such event is the continuing stay of France in 
Algeria, even after that first year of unrest. Many scholars view the decision of the 
colonial power to remain in control as catastrophic for both nations. Although the truth 
can never be fully know, it certainly can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955, 
before the Philippeville Massacre, the FLN would not have been as powerful and as 
militant as it was and that the Civil War of the 1990s would have been avoided.  
 It is well-documented that there were a number of more moderate, political parties 
who were supportive of a politically liberated Algeria but believed that freedom could 
come in a form other than violence. These moderate groups did not initially support the 
doctrine of the FLN and it was only after the massive, collective response by the French 
for the Philippeville Massacre that the majority of the moderate parties joined forces with 
the FLN. One organization which bucked the popular sentiment was the Mouvement 
National Algérien, and as was previously discussed, this organization was filled with 
political moderates who would get into a violent conflict with the FLN after the summer 
of 1955. Had France left the country before August 1955, there would not have been the 
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uprising by the FLN that summer or the response of the French military, which inevitably 
provided the Algerian organization with more legitimacy from the politically moderate 
faction. The FLN would not have grown in power and the MNA would not have become 
an internal enemy of the insurgency. There would have been a moderate voice in the 
post-colonial government that would have provided Algeria a counter to the more radical, 
militant views of the FLN.  
 In addition to preserving a diversity of viewpoints, an early French departure 
would have left the FLN with little legitimacy in a free nation. There was a large power 
vacuum when French institutions left the nation, and with the purge of all moderate 
voices, the FLN used its actions in the war to justify its takeover. This was an effective 
strategy and the sentiment which emanated from the war carried the FLN for nearly thirty 
years. The combination of stagnant policy results and a younger generation, who no 
longer appreciated the war-time feeling, has been shown to have led to the questioning of 
the FLN administration, a perfectly suited situation for the Islamist political ideology to 
take root. With no war, there would not only be no platform for legitimacy of the FLN, 
but there would be a more plural and diverse pool of voices from which the government 
would have been formed. 
 In the end the wars that have torn Algeria apart can not simply be blamed on one 
specific organization. There were many individuals who took part in the War for 
Independence and the Civil War. It can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955 the 
two main issues that caused the Civil War, lack of legitimacy and moderate viewpoints, 
would not have plagued the nation; France must certainly take responsibility for its direct 
role in the 1950s conflict. It can also be claimed that the FLN of the 1950s provoked the 
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French military and created an ideology in Algeria that the use of violence can be 
justified in the goal of obtaining political success, a philosophy that was adopted by the 
FIS forty years later. It can also be disputed that the Algerian administration of the 1990s 
reacted in the same way that the French government did in the 1950s and that the FIS 
operated with tactics similar to those of the FLN during its struggle for liberation. In the 
end, Algeria has never been able to create its own history, having always been 
monopolized by a single power. When finally given the chance to be a free nation, the 
FLN and Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its 
European predecessor while the FIS knew of no other way to express its discontent than 
through a violent revolution like the FLN. After nearly fifty years of political liberation, 
the Algerians have created a cyclical pattern where violence and political success have 
become mutually exclusive and change must come at the cost of hundreds of thousands 
of lives. 
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